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ADMISSIBILITY OF EXPERT TESTIMONY IN
CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE CASES IN
CALIFORNIA: RETIRE KELL Y-FR YE AND
RETURN TO A TRADITIONAL
ANALYSIS
Linda E. Carter*
I. INTRODUCTION
Cases involving child sexual abuse frequently include expert testi-
mony. The cases may be civil or criminal. Civil cases arise as depen-
dency or neglect cases in juvenile court or as child custody or daycare
license-revocation proceedings.' Criminal cases arise when the abuser is
prosecuted under a criminal statute.2 Experts, such as psychiatrists, psy-
chologists, or social workers, are called to the stand to help the factfinder
determine if the abuse occurred. The type of testimony may vary. The
expert, for example, may testify that the child was sexually molested,
that the child's symptoms are consistent with the behavior of sexually
abused children or with the child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome
(CSAAS),3 or that sexually abused children in general respond with cer-
tain behaviors.
One of the major challenges to expert testimony on child sexual
abuse is whether such testimony must meet the Kelly-Frye standard of
admissibility4 and, if so, whether that standard is satisfied. The Kelly-
Frye standard requires that a new scientific technique invoked by the ex-
pert be generally accepted within the relevant scientific community.
5
* Associate Professor of Law, McGeorge School of Law, University of the Pacific; B.A.,
University of Illinois at Champaign-Urbana, 1974, J.D., University of Utah, 1978.
1. See, e-g., Seering v. California Dept. of Social Servs., 194 Cal. App. 3d 298, 239 Cal.
Rptr. 422 (1st Dist. 1987) (daycare license revocation proceeding); In re Amber B., 191 Cal.
App. 3d 682, 236 Cal. Rptr. 623 (Ist Dist. 1987) (dependency proceeding).
2. See, eg., People v. Roscoe, 168 Cal. App. 3d 1093, 215 Cal. Rptr. 45 (5th Dist. 1985)
(prosecution under California Penal Code section 288a(b)(2), oral copulation with a person
under 16, and section 286(b)(2), sodomy with a person under 16).
3. See infra notes 105-06 and accompanying text.
4. Under the Kelly-Frye standard, a new scientific technique must be generally accepted
within the relevant scientific community in order to be admissible. See Frye v. United States,
293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923); People v. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d 24, 549 P.2d 1240, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144
(1976). For a discussion of the development of the Kelly-Frye standard, see infra notes 23-53.
5. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d at 30, 549 P.2d at 1244, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 148 (1976).
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The standard has proved problematic. The courts of appeal in California
are struggling with the following issues: Whether the methodology of the
experts in child sexual abuse cases constitutes a "new scientific tech-
nique;" whether it makes a difference if the expert testifies on the basis of
a "syndrome" or merely states a clinical opinion that the child was
abused; and whether Kelly-Frye should apply if the expert speaks only in
generalized terms, without refexence to the specific child in the case.
There is presently little guidance from the California Supreme Court
on the applicability of Kelly-Frye to expert testimony in child sexual
abuse cases. The courts of appeal have looked to decisions from the
supreme court that analyze the applicability of the Kelly-Frye test to
other forms of expert testimony. The appellate courts, however, are
faced with difficult questions regarding the purpose of the Kelly-Frye rule
and its applicability in the child sexual abuse context.
This Article explores the California Supreme Court decisions on the
Kelly-Frye standard and its application by the courts of appeal to expert
testimony in child sexual abuse cases. The first section presents an over-
view of the evidence rules on experts and the development of the Kelly-
Frye standard. The second section analyzes decisions applying Kelly-
Frye to psychological6 testimony. The third section explores the conflict-
ing decisions by the courts of appeal on the applicability of Kelly-Frye to
expert testimony in cases of child sexual abuse. An alternative standard
for admissibility of expert testimony, the "traditional or relevancy analy-
sis," is explained in the fourth section. The final section proposes that
the California courts adopt a modified traditional analysis using eviden-
tiary rules on expert testimony and relevance. This approach would pro-
vide a coherent theoretical framework for testing the admissibility of
expert testimony on child sexual abuse and other areas of expertise. Both
the viability of the Kelly-Frye test and the mechanics of the alternative
proposed are analyzed in the context of California evidence law, includ-
ing the probable impact of Proposition 8, the Truth-in-Evidence Initia-
tive, upon the standards.7 The Article concludes with a comparison of
the traditional analysis with a Kelly-Frye analysis in two areas already
addressed by the California Supreme Court-rape trauma syndrome and
eyewitness identification-and in the uncharted area of child sexual
abuse.
6. The term "psychological" is used in this Article to describe testimony relating to
mental and behavioral traits or manifestations. The testimony is typically that of psychiatrists,
psychologists, or social workers.
7. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28. For the text of the provision, see infra text accompanying
note 290.
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II. OVERVIEW OF THE FOUNDATION REQUIRED
FOR EXPERT TESTIMONY
The proponent of expert testimony must lay a foundation before the
expert will be permitted to testify.' This foundation consists of demon-
strating that the topic is a proper subject for expert testimony, that the
witness qualifies as an expert, and that, if the testimony is based on a
novel scientific test or principle, it is generally accepted in the relevant
scientific community.9 Evidence codes typically contain the proper sub-
ject and expert qualification requirement.10 Evidence codes also gener-
ally provide rules on the appropriate bases of the opinion." The
California Evidence Code follows this pattern.1 2 The requirement of
general acceptance of a scientific principle, however, is ordinarily a judi-
cially created rule. The Kelly-Frye test in California is an example of a
non-codified, judicially developed rule. This section reviews the perti-
nent California Evidence Code provisions in the first subpart; the second
subpart discusses the development of the Kelly-Frye test.
A. California Evidence Code Requirements for Expert Testimony
The test for determining whether the subject of proposed expert tes-
timony is a proper one for expert opinion is stated in Evidence Code
section 801.13 That section provides: "If a witness is testifying as an
expert, his testimony in the form of an opinion is limited to such an opin-
ion as is (a) related to a subject that is sufficiently beyond common expe-
rience that the opinion of an expert would assist the trier of fact.... ,,11
Thus, expert opinion must be more than merely relevant.1" It must also
assist the trier of fact because the topic is one about which most people
would not be knowledgeable. If the trier of fact could make the appro-
priate interpretations and conclusions on its own, the expert testimony is
not admissible. 6 This rule reflects the preference for factual, rather than
8. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 801 (West 1966).
9. See id. §§ 801, 720.
10. See, ag., FED. R. EVID. 702.
11. See, eg., FED. R. EVID. 703.
12. CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 720, 801 (West 1966).
13. Id. § 801.
14. Id.
15. Relevance is established by merely demonstrating that the evidence has "any tendency
in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the determination of
the action." CAL. EVID. CODE § 210.
16. See, ag., Westbrooks v. State, 173 Cal. App. 3d 1203, 1210, 219 Cal. Rptr. 674, 678
(2d Dist. 1985) (no need for expert testimony that highway not dangerous where jurors could
easily reach conclusion on basis of facts such as presence of flares and sheriff's vehicle).
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opinion, testimony"7 and the policy to let the factfinder resolve all possi-
ble issues. It is feared that the authority of an expert may preempt delib-
eration on the issue by the trier, particularly a jury.
18
An expert must also be qualified. Qualifications are governed by
section 720(a) which provides that "a person is qualified to testify as an
expert if he has special knowledge, skill, experience, training, or educa-
tion sufficient to qualify him as an expert on the subject to which his
testimony relates."19 The type of background necessary to qualify as an
expert is thus quite broad. The rule liberally permits credentials other
than academic degrees to satisfy the qualification requirement.
Admissibility of expert testimony is also subject to rules regulating
acceptable bases for the opinion. Section 801(b) states the general rule
that the expert may base an opinion on personal knowledge or facts made
known to him.' 0 Although the facts themselves may be inadmissible in
evidence, they can still form a basis for an opinion if they are "of a type
that reasonably may be relied upon by an expert in forming an opinion
upon the subject.... . 2I This rule allows great latitude to the expert and
tries to conform legal admissibility to the world of the expert's field.22
Experts thus may well rely on inadmissible hearsay statements, for exam-
ple, or on facts told to the expert by the attorneys.
This codified approach to the subject matter, qualification, and ba-
17. In development of the common law of evidence, there was a preference for "fact"
rather than "opinion." See, e.g., 3 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 375
(1977).
18. See People v. McDonald, 37 Cal. 3d 351, 362, 368, 690 P.2d 709, 716, 720, 208 Cal.
Rptr. 236, 243, 247 (1984), where the trial court found expert testimony on eyewitness identifi-
cation would invade the province of the jury, but the California Supreme Court held that such
testimony would assist the jury. A concern with preempting the trier from deciding the factual
issues was also the root of the traditional rule that the expert could not express an opinion on
the "ultimate issue." See D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 17, at § 394. This rule has
been abandoned in modern codes such as California's. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 805 (West
1966).
19. CAL. EvID. CODE § 720.
20. Id. § 801(b). Section 801(b) provides that the expert's opinion must be
based on matter (including his special knowledge, skill, experience, training, and edu-
cation) perceived by or personally known to the witness or made known to him at or
before the hearing, whether or not admissible, that is of a type that reasonably may
be relied upon by an expert in forming an opinion upon the subject to which his
testimony relates, unless an expert is precluded by law from using such matter as a
basis for his opinion.
21. Id.
22. Id. However, California Evidence Code sections 803 And 804 further regulate the ba-
ses of expert opinion. Section 803 provides for exclusion of the entire expert opinion or part of
the basis of the opinion if the basis is improper. Id. § 803. Section 804 provides for cross-
examination, if the person is available, of anyone whose opinion or statement is relied upon by
the expert. Id. § 804.
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ses-of-opinion requirements contrasts with the test developed through
case law for the admissibility of testimony based on a scientific principle.
That test is the subject of the next subpart.
B. The Development of the Kelly-Frye Test
In 1923, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
decided Frye v. United States.23 The court ruled inadmissible the results
of a test performed on a precursor to the polygraph. In now-famous
language, the court stated:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line be-
tween the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to
define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of
the principle must be recognized, and while courts will go a
long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-
recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from
which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to
have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which
it belongs.24
As a consequence of this case, the Frye test has become part of the
foundation that must be laid by the proponent of scientific evidence. The
proponent must demonstrate that the scientific principle, discovery,
methodology or technique is generally accepted in the relevant scientific
community.2" Ordinary evidence must merely have a tendency to prove
or disprove a consequential fact in the cause of action.26 As explained,
more is demanded of a new scientific principle. Thus, the test is, in es-
sence, a heightened standard for admissibility.
In California, the Frye test was used27 prior to the 1976 case of Peo-
ple v. Kelly.28 Since 1976, the test's applicability to novel scientific evi-
dence has come to be known in this state as the Kelly-Frye test. The
Kelly case involved voiceprint analysis.2 9 The California Supreme Court
23. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
24. Id. at 1014.
25. See, eg., People v. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d 24, 30, 549 P.2d 1240, 1244, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144,
148 (1976) (California's formulation of Frye test).
26. See CAL. EvID. CODE § 210 (West 1966) (" 'Relevant evidence' means evidene ...
having any tendency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to
the determination of the action."); FED. R. EVID. 401 ("'Relevant evidence' means evidence
having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determina-
tion of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.").
27. See cases cited in Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d at 30, 549 P.2d at 1244, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 148.
28. 17 Cal. 3d 24, 549 P.2d 1240, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144 (1976).
29. Id. at 27-28, 549 P.2d at 1242, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 146.
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held inadmissible voiceprint analysis because the proponent of the evi-
dence had failed to establish general acceptance of the technique in the
relevant community.30 Since Kelly, the California Supreme Court has
applied the test to situations involving psychological testimony based on
techniques such as hypnosis31 and rape trauma syndrome.
32
The test has required further interpretation. One issue is whether
there must be general acceptance of the theory itself or just the applica-
tion of that theory. For example, there may be general acceptance that
systolic blood pressure is affected by deception, but not that the poly-
graph measures deception. Or the reverse may be true; the test measures
deception, but there is no agreement on the theory explaining the re-
sult.33 Compulsive gambling provides another example from the realm
of psychology. There may be general agreement on the existence of a
compulsive gambling disorder, but not that the disorder could cause one
to do something criminal such as evading taxes.34 Another psychological
example is rape trauma syndrome cases. There may be general accept-
ance of a pattern of behaviors for rape victims, but not that rape trauma
syndrome indicates that the victim was raped.35
Another issue involving the interpretation of the Kelly-Frye test is
the meaning of "general acceptance." Is it a head-counting function?
Does it mean that the technique is accepted by more than half of the
experts in a given field? The term escapes precise definition.36 Choosing
the "relevant scientific community" also is subject to debate and manipu-
lation. For example, if one polls all certified polygraph examiners, one
might find general acceptance of the use of polygraphs to determine
whether a person is lying. On the other hand, if one polls a wider "com-
munity," such as polling those in all of the psychological disciplines, it is
less likely there will be general acceptance of the polygraph test.1
7
A further difficult issue, especially with respect to psychological tes-
timony, is what constitutes a new scientific principle or discovery. For
example, the court in Kelly stated that the test applied to a "novel
30. Id. at 40-41, 549 P.2d at 1251, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 155.
31. People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 641 P.2d 775, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243 (1982).
32. People v. Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d 236, 681 P.2d 291, 203 Cal. Rptr. 450 (1984).
33. See Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States, a
Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197, 1211-15 (1980).
34. United States v. Shorter, 618 F. Supp. 255, 260 (D.D.C.), aff'd, 809 F.2d 54 (D.C. Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 71 (1987) (general acceptance existed regarding the disorder, but
not that disorder was linked to failure to pay taxes).
35. See Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d at 251, 681 P.2d at 301, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 460. But see State v.
Marks, 647 P.2d 1292, 1299 (Kan. 1982).
36. For a discussion of the varied definitions, see Giannelli, supra note 33, at 1210-11.
37. See id. at 1209.
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method of proof"38 or to a new "technique." 39 It has been applied to
new "techniques" such as "lie detectors, 'truth serum', Naline testing,
experimental systems of blood typing, 'voiceprints', identification by
human bite marks, microscopic analysis of gun shot residue... hypnosis,
... and... rape trauma syndrome.
' 40
Despite the foregoing interpretational quandaries, courts cling tena-
ciously to the Kelly-Frye standard. Several reasons are typically ad-
vanced to justify the rule. First, there is a fear that the trier of fact will
accord a scientific test an "'aura of certainty'" which does not permit
them to assess adequately the reliability of a novel technique or process.
4 1
Thus, scientific tests should meet a high standard of reliability before
they are put into evidence. Second, the Kelly-Frye standard largely
removes from the judge the determination of the reliability of a new pro-
cess and places it in the hands of the scientific community.42 The appro-
priate scientific community has more knowledge of the particular
scientific principles than an average judge. The system thus relies upon
the expertise of the relevant scientific community, rather than relying
upon individual judges to make determinations in highly technical scien-
tific fields. This promotes consistency in decisions on the admissibility of
evidence,43 since individual judges are more likely to differ in their assess-
ment of the reliability of scientific evidence than is the relevant scientific
community as a whole. Additionally, the test further ensures that the
opposing side will have access to experts who can critique the propo-
nent's evidence.' This serves to preserve a balance in our adversary
system.
The proponent of the scientific evidence bears the burden to demon-
strate general acceptance. The burden of establishing general acceptance
within the relevant scientific community may be met by calling witnesses
who are experts in the field to attest to the scientific test's acceptance.45
Typically, the expert will testify that the process or technique is generally
acceptable. The courts take a conservative approach in determining
38. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d at 30, 549 P.2d at 1244, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 148.
39. Id. at 32, 549 P.2d at 1245, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 149.
40. People v. McDonald, 37 Cal. 3d 351, 373, 690 P.2d 709, 724, 208 Cal. Rptr. 236, 251
(1984).
41. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d at 32, 549 P.2d at 1245, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 149 (citing Huntingdon v.
Crowley, 64 Cal. 2d 647, 656, 414 P.2d 382, 390, 51 Cal. Rptr. 254, 262 (1966)).
42. Id. at 31, 549 P.2d at 1244, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 148.
43. Id., 549 P.2d at 1244-45, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 148-49.
44. Id., 549 P.2d at 1244, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 148.
45. See McCord, Syndromes, Profiles and other Mental Exotica: A New Approach to the
Admissibility of Nontraditonal Psychological Evidence in Criminal Cases, 66 ORE. L. REV. 18
(1980); McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 206, at 634-37 (3d ed. 1984).
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whether experts' testimony is sufficient. One witness' testimony is un-
likely to satisfy the burden of establishing general acceptance.46 Evi-
dence of a "typical cross-section of the scientific community" is more
desirable.4 7 The Kelly court noted that the proponent's expert is unlikely
to be impartial on the issue of the reliability of the process or technique
where the expert has relied on it for his or her testimony.48 Conse-
quently, the expert called to testify to an opinion on a crucial issue in the
case, such as whether the blood sample matches the accused's or whether
the victim was abused, cannot by him or herself establish the general
acceptance of the scientific technique underlying the opinion. Supple-
mental evidence is needed, such as other witnesses, literature in the field
describing studies on the reliability of the scientific technique,49 or cita-
tions to judicial opinions where the particular type of expert testimony
was found to be generally accepted."
Despite the complexity of its application, the Kelly-Frye test is
firmly rooted in California. The addition of Proposition 8, the "Truth-
in-Evidence" measure,51 to the California Constitution raises questions,
however, about the continued viability of the test.52 The supreme court
could in the future interpret the Truth-in-Evidence provision to eliminate
the Kelly-Frye test. Nevertheless, the courts of appeal almost uniformly
continue to wrestle with whether the test applies to expert testimony on
child sexual abuse. Thus, it is important to examine the test's application
in child sexual abuse cases. The next section provides the background of
California Supreme Court cases that have addressed the applicability of
the Kelly-Frye test to psychological testimony generally. It is followed by
an examination of the test's application to psychological testimony in
child sexual abuse cases.
III. APPLICATION OF THE KELLY-FRYE TEST
TO PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTIMONY
The problems in applying the Kelly-Frye test to new scientific tech-
niques 3 are exacerbated when the technique in question relates to mental
health. If the technique involves a physical process, such as hypnosis or
46. Id. at 37, 549 P.2d at 1248, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 152.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 38, 549 P.2d at 1249, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 153.
49. See, eg., Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d at 241 n.4, 681 P.2d at 294 n.4, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 453 n.4.
50. Id. at 248-49, 681 P.2d at 299; 203 Cal. Rptr. at 458.
51. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28.
52. See infra notes 290-308 and accompanying text for a discussion of the possible effects
of Proposition 8 on the Kelly-Frye test.
53. See supra notes 33-40 and accompanying text.
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administering truth serum, the courts generally subject the process to the
Kelly-Frye test. 4 The more difficult cases are those where the opinion is
dependent upon a set of newly identified principles or symptoms. The
identification of new principles or symptoms has given rise to various
"syndromes" and "profiles" in the psychological literature.5 There is
disagreement among courts whether syndromes and profiles are subject
to a general acceptance standard and, if so, whether that standard is
satisfied. 6
The California Supreme Court has applied the Kelly-Frye test to
psychological testimony selectively. Although Kelly-Frye applies to psy-
chological as well as physical evidence, an expert's "personal opinion" is
not subject to the test 7 since personal opinion is not novel scientific evi-
dence. In addition, the court has indicated that some forms of expert
testimony may be "factual" and thus not be subject to any of the expert
"opinion" rules, including the Kelly-Frye test. 8 The court has held,
however, that Kelly-Frye did apply to expert testimony on rape trauma
syndrome.59 The distinction between scientific evidence, which is subject
to Kelly-Frye, and personal opinion or factual testimony, which need not
meet Kelly-Frye, can be ephemeral.
The supreme court recognized the applicability of the Kelly-Frye
test to psychological processes in People v. Shirley.' In Shirley, the court
held that hypnotically refreshed testimony was subject to the Kelly-Frye
rule and failed the test of being generally accepted within the relevant
scientific community.6' The State had argued that the Kelly-Frye rule
was limited to a new technique involving physical evidence.62 The court
rejected this argument, stating:
Nor are those techniques necessarily limited to manipulation of
54. See, e.g., People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 641 P.2d 775, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243 (1982)
(hypnosis); State ex reL Collins v. Superior Court, 132 Ariz. 180, 644 P.2d 1266 (1982) (hyp-
nosis); Cain v. State, 549 S.W.2d 707 (Tex. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 845 (1977)
("truth serum" test).
55. See McCord, supra note 45; MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 206, at 634-37 (3d ed.
1984).
56. Compare State v. Marks, 231 Kan. 645, 647 P.2d 1292 (1982) (testimony that victim
suffering from syndrome admitted where consent defense) with People v. Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d
236, 681 P.2d 291, 203 Cal. Rptr. 450 (1984) (testimony that victim suffering from syndrome
inadmissible to show rape occurred).
57. People v. McDonald, 37 Cal. 3d 351, 372-73, 690 P.2d 709, 723-24, 208 Cal. Rptr. 236,
250-51 (1984).
58. Id.
59. See Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d at 248-49, 681 P.2d at 299-300, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 458-59.
60. 31 Cal. 3d 18, 641 P.2d 775, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243 (1982).
61. Id. at 54, 66, 641 P.2d at 796, 804, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 265, 272-73.
62. Id. at 52, 641 P.2d at 795, 181 Cal. Rptr at 263-64.
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physical evidence: we do not doubt that if testimony based on a
new scientific process operating on purely psychological evi-
dence were to be offered in our courts, it would likewise be sub-
jected to the Frye standard of admissibility. In either case, the
rule serves its salutary purpose of preventing the jury from be-
ing misled by unproven and ultimately unsound scientific
methods. 3
Despite the broad language of Shirley, the court has exempted the
"personal opinion" of a psychological expert from the Kelly-Frye require-
ments. In People v. McDonald," the court distinguished an expert's per-
sonal opinion from scientific evidence .6  The court stated that the Kelly-
Frye rule did not apply, for example, to expert medical testimony, includ-
ing expert psychiatric testimony.66 The court reasoned that the purpose
of imposing the Kelly-Frye rule did not exist when the testimony was
personal opinion because jurors are naturally more skeptical toward an
expert's verbal opinion than they are toward machine-processed evi-
dence, which exudes an "aura of infallibility." 67
In McDonald, the court held Kelly-Frye inapplicable to expert opin-
ion testimony describing the general principles of perception, memory,
and recall of eyewitnesses. 8 The court also noted that the same was true
for psychiatric opinion testimony regarding a description of an unusual
mental illness called "Munchausen's syndrome by proxy" which had
arisen in an earlier court of appeal case. 9 On the other hand, the court
included rape trauma syndrome in its list of "novel devices or processes"
that must meet the Kelly-Frye test.70 The McDonald case thus provides
conflicting signals to courts determining whether a new syndrome should
be subject to the Kelly-Frye test. Moreover, the distinction between per-
sonal opinion and scientific evidence ignores the fact that all expert opin-
ion is based on some underlying theory or process. To be consistent, all
63. Id. at 53, 641 P.2d at 795, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 264. Although the Shirley court consid-
ered the purpose of the Kelly-Frye rule in the context ofjury trials, the lower courts have found
the rule applicable in proceedings before a judge sitting without a jury. See, e.g., Seering v.
California Dept. of Social Servs., 194 Cal. App. 3d 298, 239 Cal. Rptr. 422 (1987); In re
Amber B., 191 Cal. App. 3d 682, 236 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1987). The concern that the trier will be
overwhelmed by the expert testimony is certainly greater when a jury is involved.
64. 37 Cal. 3d 351, 690 P.2d 709, 208 Cal. Rptr. 236 (1984).
65. Id. at 372, 690 P.2d at 724, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 250-51.
66. Id. at 373, 690 P.2d at 724, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 251.
67. Id. at 372-73, 690 P.2d at 724, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 251.
68. Id. at 373, 690 P.2d at 724, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 251.
69. Id. See infra notes 78-83 and accompanying text for a discussion of the case involving
Munchausen's syndrome by proxy.
70. 37 Cal. 3d at 373, 690 P.2d at 724, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 251.
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expert testimony must be subjected to a general acceptance standard if
the principle it is based on is novel.
The failure of the "personal opinion" categorization to meaningfully
differentiate expert opinion from "scientific evidence" may be demon-
strated with a typical medical opinion. Suppose an expert testifies that
an individual will recover only partial use of an injured arm. That opin-
ion is based on medical principles regarding the usual healing process for
bones, muscles, and ligaments. The principles were deduced from studies
of individuals with similar injuries involving x-rays and physical exami-
nation. It seems unnecessary to subject the expert's opinion that the indi-
vidual will not regain full use of the arm to a Kelly-Frye test because the
principles and the methodology involved are so universally accepted.
Nevertheless, how many jurors readily understand the biological and
chemical principles underlying the expert's opinion? What if an oppos-
ing expert disputes the likelihood of irreparable injury on the basis of a
new molecular scanning technique or a new theory of regeneration of
cells which indicates complete healing could occur? It may be the ex-
pert's "personal" opinion that healing will occur, but that opinion is nec-
essarily grounded in scientific principles. A court would undoubtedly
subject the new process or theory to a Kelly-Frye test. It is unnecessary
to subject the first expert's opinion to Kelly-Frye, not because the opinion
is "personal," but because it is based on well-established principles.
The same reasoning is arguably true for most psychological testi-
mony. When an expert opines that an individual is schizophrenic, for
example, the principles underlying the diagnosis as well as the process for
arriving at the diagnosis are well-established. The opinion is based on a
collection of symptoms that the psychological professions have agreed
constitute schizophrenia. The expert probably diagnosed the condition
through personally interviewing the individual and through testing, both
traditional methods within the psychological profession. However, med-
ical or psychological testimony could be based on either a new principle
or a new methodology for determining the diagnosis. What if schizo-
phrenia was instead diagnosed on the basis of the presence of certain
substances in the brain? Is the psychiatric opinion that the patient is
schizophrenic no longer "personal" and instead "scientific evidence?" It
is more logical to recognize that the opinion is now based on a new the-
ory, the presence of specific substances in the brain, rather than the ac-
cepted theory of a collection of behavioral symptoms. Both opinions are
"personal" and both are based on scientific principles.
The McDonald court's distinction between "personal" opinion and
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scientific evidence71 thus fails to provide much guidance in new areas
because it merely states the conclusion first. If the opinion is "personal,"
it is based on accepted principles or methodology. If the opinion involves
"scientific evidence," the principles or methodology are new. We are still
left with the need to define what constitutes the principles and methodol-
ogy underlying the expert opinion and whether either is novel.
The California Supreme Court has also distinguished between an
expert who gives generalized factual information and one who expresses
an opinion on the facts in the case. In the McDonald case, for example,
the expert intended to testify only to the factors that research has shown
affect an eyewitness' perception, memory and recall, without expressing
an opinion regarding the witnesses in the particular case.72 The court
questioned whether this type of testimony which repeats the content of
research in the field is opinion at all.73 The court stated that "the con-
tents of eyewitness identification studies reported in the professional liter-
ature-their methodology, their data, and their findings-are facts,
verifiable by anyone who can read and understand the studies in ques-
tion."'74 If purely factual, the court noted that the requirement that ex-
pert testimony be "beyond the common experience" of the factfinder
would not apply.75 Although the McDonald court did not discuss the
Kelly-Frye test at this juncture, if the testimony was not deemed to be
"expert opinion," there would be no scientific process underlying the tes-
timony to analyze under Kelly-Frye.76
The California Supreme Court has not addressed whether it also
would view an expert's testimony as purely factual if the expert described
not only the literature in the field, but also analyzed the effect of specific
facts in the case. In McDonald, for example, the expert intended to com-
ment on factors in the particular case that could have influenced the wit-
nesses, such as the suddenness of the event, the youth of the witnesses,
and the difference in race between the witnesses and the defendant. 77
Although the expert still would not have expresssed an opinion on the
fallibility of the individual witnesses in the case, he would have applied
71. Id. at 372, 690 P.2d at 724, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 250-51.
72. Id. at 361-62, 690 P.2d at 716, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 242-43.
73. Id. at 366-67, 690 P.2d at 719, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 246.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. The McDonald court, however, did not pursue this avenue, instead treating the testi-
mony as expert opinion which would have met the requirement that expert opinion testimony
be "sufficiently beyond common experience." Id. at 369, 690 P.2d at 721, 208 Cal. Rptr. at
248.
77. Id. at 362, 690 P.2d at 715, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 243.
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the principles from the literature to the facts in the case. The jury would
in essence have had the expert's opinion that several factors in the case
typically impair identification. The jury would only have had to draw
the logical inference that the witnesses' identification was flawed and that
the expert probably believed that the identification was impaired. The
expert's opinion, both as to the impact of specific facts in the case and his
implied opinion regarding the specific witnesses in the case, was thus
conveyed to the jury.
A similar situation involving arguably "factual" testimony arose in
People v. Phillips.78 In Phillips, a psychiatrist expressed an opinion that a
hypothetical person exhibiting the same behavior as the defendant had
allegedly exhibited "symptoms consistent with Munchausen's syndrome
by proxy."7 9 The court of appeal treated the testimony as opinion, not as
"factual." 80 In fact, the supreme court in McDonald cited the testimony
as an example of "personal opinion."'" Although the expert refused to
comment on the defendant herself, the impact of his testimony was to
lead the jury to draw the inference that this defendant suffered from the
syndrome.82 The effect was the same as in McDonald. The express opin-
ion that the behavior in the case fit the syndrome and the implied opinion
that, therefore, the defendant suffered from the syndrome, was conveyed
to the jury.
83
Despite the court's view that the Phillips testimony was personal
opinion, the California Supreme Court has applied the Kelly-Frye test to
78. 122 Cal. App. 3d 69, 175 Cal. Rptr. 703 (1st Dist. 1981).
79. Id. at 78, 175 Cal. Rptr at 709. The syndrome occurs where a person exhibits great
care and concern over the illness of another (like a child), but in fact has caused that illness
(such as by poisoning the child). Id.
80. Id. at 82-83, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 711.
81. McDonald, 37 Cal. 3d at 372, 690 P.2d at 724, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 251 (citing People v.
Phillips, 122 Cal. App. 3d 69, 175 Cal. Rptr. 703 (1st Dist. 1981)). Although the supreme
court in McDonald classified the expert's testimony in Phillips as personal opinion, the court of
appeal covered both alternatives: Either Kelly-Frye was not applicable or the syndrome was
generally accepted because there was no controversy. On the Kelly-Frye issue, the Phillips
court found that the syndrome was generally accepted in the scientific community on the basis
that the evidence was neither based on a new "scientific technique" nor was it the subject of
controversy within the appropriate scientific field. Phillips, 122 Cal. App. 3d at 87, 175 Cal.
Rptr. at 714. On the latter point, the court analogized to People v. Jackson, 18 Cal. App. 3d
504, 95 Cal. Rptr. 919 (1971), which involved battered child syndrome. The Phillips court
borrowed the Jackson court's analysis that the syndrome was an "'accepted medical diagno-
sis,' "made on the basis of uncontroverted research. Phillips, 122 Cal. App. 3d at 87, 175 Cal.
Rptr. at 714 (quoting People v. Jackson, 18 Cal. App. 3d 504, 507, 95 Cal. Rptr. 919, 921 (4th
Dist. 1971)).
82. Phillips, 122 Cal. App. 3d at 87, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 714.
83. Id.
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syndrome evidence. In People v. Bledsoe,84 the court referred to its lan-
guage in Shirley, that Kelly-Frye could apply to even purely psychologi-
cal evidence, and subjected rape trauma syndrome to the test's
admissibility requirements.85 The expert in Bledsoe, a rape counselor,
had given her opinion that the victim was suffering from the syndrome in
the state's case-in-chief.86 The court held that rape trauma syndrome
could not meet the general acceptance standard for the purpose of estab-
lishing that a rape had in fact occurred.87 The court noted that the syn-
drome was instead developed as a therapeutic aid to "help identify,
predict and treat emotional problems experienced by the counselors' cli-
ents or patients.""8 This distinguished rape trauma syndrome from bat-
tered child syndrome, which the court observed was developed
specifically to identify children with non-accidental injuries.89 Unlike
rape trauma syndrome as used in the Bledsoe case, the use of battered
child syndrome in court thus parallels its medical purpose.
The court in Bledsoe did condone, however, the use of rape trauma
syndrome evidence when a defendant argues that the victim's behavior
was inconsistent with being raped.90 Thus, if the defendant argued that
the victim's delay in reporting the rape indicated consent, an expert
could testify that such behavior is a typical reaction of rape victims.91
The court did not discuss the application of Kelly-Frye when the syn-
drome is used for this purpose. The court may have been implying that a
rebuttal use of the syndrome that "may play a particularly useful role by
disabusing the jury of some widely held misconceptions about rape and
rape victims" 92 would satisfy Kelly-Frye because such a description of
behavior would match the accepted use of the syndrome in practice. Al-
ternatively, the court may have meant that a description of the syndrome
would fall within the parameters of the McDonald and Phillips categories
of factual or personal opinion testimony.
The proper application of the Kelly-Frye test to a new situation is
cloudy at best in light of these decisions from the California Supreme
Court. The greatest difficulty in applying these decisions is in defining
84. 36 Cal. 3d 236, 681 P.2d 291, 203 Cal. Rptr. 450 (1984).
85. Id. at 247 n.7, 681 P.2d at 298 n.7, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 457 n.7. The State apparently
conceded that Frye was appropriate in the case.
86. Id. at 240-44, 681 P.2d at 295-96, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 455.
87. Id. at 250-51, 681 P.2d at 301, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 460.
88. Id. at 249-50, 681 P.2d at 300, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 459.
89. Id. at 248-51, 249 n.l1, 681 P.2d at 299-300, 300 n.ll, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 458-60, 459
n.11.
90. Id. at 247-48, 681 P.2d at 298-99, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 457-58.
91. Id. at 247, 681 P.2d at 298, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 457.
92. Id.
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what constitutes a new technique or process that must be subjected to
Kelly-Frye. On the one hand, Shirley indicates that a new process in psy-
chological testimony is subject to Kelly-Frye.93 The Bledsoe decision fol-
lows this edict in applying Kelly-Frye to rape trauma syndrome.94 On
the other hand, factual or personal opinion expert testimony is exempted
from Kelly-Frye under the McDonald rationale.9" Moreover, even where
Kelly-Frye applies, the use of expert testimony on rebuttal may either
meet the test easily or the test may not apply at all.96 Bledsoe speaks to
the issue of the rebuttal use of the testimony, but does not clarify it.97 As
a consequence of these conflicting analyses, it is not surprising that the
appellate courts have reached vastly differing conclusions through a vari-
ety of rationales when faced with the issue of whether to apply the Kelly-
Frye test to expert testimony in a new area-child sexual abuse. The
next section focuses on decisions from the courts of appeal in child sexual
abuse cases.
IV. APPLICATION OF THE KELLY-FRYE TEST TO EXPERT
TESTIMONY ON CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE
Experts, usually psychologists, psychiatrists, or clinical social work-
ers, are frequently called as witnesses when there is an issue whether a
child has been abused. Children are often poor witnesses due to their
youth, trauma, or intimidation in the courtroom.9" Because there is typi-
cally no physical evidence, 99 the verbal testimony of the child, the expert,
and possibly others to whom the child told of the abuse often constitutes
the only evidence against the defendant in a criminal proceeding or
against the parents in a dependency case. Some forms of expert testi-
mony on sexual abuse are seldom controversial. For example, if the ex-
pert testifies to physical manifestations of the abuse, such as injury to the
child's genitals, and expresses the opinion that the injury is consistent
with sexual abuse, there is little debate that this opinion is safely within
the realm of medical knowledge."° At the other end of the spectrum, if
93. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d at 53, 641 P.2d at 795, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 264.
94. Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d at 245-51, 681 P.2d at 296-99, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 456-59.
95. McDonald, 37 Cal. 3d at 372-73, 690 P.2d at 723-24, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 250-51.
96. Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d at 245-51, 681 P.2d at 296-99, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 456-59.
97. Id.
98. J. MYERS, CHILD WITNESS LAW AND PRACTICE §§ 4.4, 10.13, 10.43 (1987); Com-
ment, The Admissibility of Expert Testimony in Intrafamily Child Sexual Abuse Cases, 34
UCLA L. REV. 175, 175-76 (1986).
99. J. MYERS, supra note 98, at §§ 4.4, 10.13, 10.43; Comment, supra note 98, at 178-79.
100. See, eg., People v. Mendibles, 199 Cal. App. 3d 1277, 245 Cal. Rptr. 553 (2d Dist.
1988) (not error to admit expert's testimony that scarring in genitals consistent with digital
and penile penetration); In re Katrina L., 200 Cal. App. 3d 1288, 247 Cal. Rptr. 751 (1st Dist.
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the expert testifies that the child is "believable" or "truthful," the courts
will most likely exclude the evidence.101 The same is true where the ex-
pert gives an opinion that the child was abused by a particular person. 102
The courts tend to find that the expert opinion under these circumstances
is not helpful to the trier of fact, beyond the expertise of the expert, or
based totally on hearsay.
10 3
Controversial expert testimony involves opinions on whether the
child has been abused based on psychological, rather than physical, evi-
dence. Such expert testimony may be phrased in many ways. The most
typical are: (1) "this child is suffering from child sexual abuse accommo-
dation syndrome (CSAAS)" or "this child's behavior (such as a delay in
reporting the abuse) is consistent with CSAAS"; (2) "this child's behav-
ior is consistent with children who are sexually abused"; (3) "this child
was sexually abused"; and (4) "sexually abused children (without speci-
fying this particular child) exhibit these types of behavior." 1" The last
form may arise either in the state's case-in-chief or in rebuttal. The ap-
plicability of the Kelly-Frye test to these forms of testimony is the most
troubling.
The bases of experts' opinions vary. Some experts base their opinion
in part on whether the child's behavior is consistent with CSAAS.105
The five attributes of such children are: "secrecy, helplessness, compart-
mentalized accommodation (or denial), delayed disclosure and retrac-
tion." 106 Other typical bases include interviews with the child,107
1988) (expert testified to physical changes in child's genitalia consistent with penetration). But
see People v. Luna, 204 Cal. App. 3d 726, 250 Cal. Rptr. 878 (5th Dist. 1988) (defendants
raised Kelly-Frye challenge to expert testimony regarding physical injuries based on examina-
tion with a colposcope, but court found Kelly-Frye inapplicable).
101. See, e.g., People v. Willoughby, 164 Cal. App. 3d 1054, 210 Cal. Rptr. 880 (5th Dist.
1985); In re Cheryl H., 153 Cal. App. 3d 1098, 200 Cal. Rptr. 789 (2d Dist. 1984).
102. See, e.g., In re Heather H., 200 Cal. App. 3d 91, 246 Cal. Rptr. 38 (6th Dist. 1988);
Seering v. California Dept. of Social Servs., 194 Cal. App. 3d 298, 239 Cal. Rptr. 422 (1st Dist.
1987); In re Christine C., 191 Cal. App. 3d 676, 236 Cal. Rptr. 630 (1st Dist. 1987); In re
Cheryl H., 153 Cal. App. 3d at 1106, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 799.
103. See, e.g., In re Christine C., 191 Cal. App. 3d at 680, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 632 (hearsay
problem); In re Cheryl H., 153 Cal. App. 3d at 1119, 1122, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 802 (hearsay
problem), 804 (no need to assist trier).
104. See infra text accompanying notes 111-241.
105. CSAAS was first described by Dr. Roland Summit in a 1983 article describing the
characteristics of the child abuse victims he had treated over a substantial period of time.
Summit, The Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome, 7 INT'L. J. OF CHILD ABUSE &
NEGLECT 177 (1983); see also Seering v. California Dept. of Social Servs., 194 Cal. App. 3d
298, 306, 239 Cal. Rptr. 422, 427 (1987).
106. Summit, supra note 105; see also Seering, 194 Cal. App. 3d at 312, 239 Cal. Rptr. at
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analysis of the child's reports of abuse,108 observing the child play with
anatomically correct dolls,10 9 and the expert's own general knowledge of
typical characteristics of sexually abused children.o
An analysis of the applicability of the Kelly-Frye rule to expert testi-
mony in child sexual abuse cases must consider both the form of the
testimony and the bases underlying the opinion. Expert opinion in these
cases will be discussed in three categories: (1) application of CSAAS to
the specific child in the case; (2) opinion that a specific child was sexually
abused without outward mention of CSAAS; and (3) generalized testi-
mony of the characteristics of sexually abused children. Within each cat-
egory, the existing case law will be described and the effectiveness of a
Kelly-Frye analysis will be discussed.
A. Opinion That Specific Child Was Abused with an Express
Reference to CSAAS
"Susie is suffering from CSAAS." "Susie's behavior is consistent
with CSAAS." "In my opinion, Susie was abused because her behavior
is consistent with CSAAS." Testimony such as this which expressly re-
fers to a new syndrome is the most likely to trigger a Kelly-Frye analysis.
The rationale of People v. BledsoeIII is directly on point in this circum-
stance. The syndrome is arguably a new device, method, process, or
technique underlying the determination that the child was sexually
abused. The rape trauma syndrome in Bledsoe was used in precisely this
manner. There, the expert testified that the victim suffered from the syn-
drome. 1 2 In the case of both CSAAS and rape trauma syndrome, the
use of the technical word "syndrome" creates "'an aura of special relia-
bility and trustworthiness' "" that the Kelly-Frye standard is designed
to monitor. Unless a court subjects CSAAS to Kelly-Frye, the trier of
fact is arguably unable to determine the reliability of the opinion because
it is clouded, by the impressive language of the syndrome's title.
One court of appeal has applied the Kelly-Frye test to an express
107. Seering, 194 Cal. App. 3d at 312, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 431; In re Cheryl H., 153 Cal. App.
3d at 1109-10, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 795.
108. In re Amber B., 191 Cal. App. 3d 682, 685, 236 Cal. Rptr. 623, 626 (1987); In re
Christine C., 191 Cal. App. 3d at 679, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 632.
109. In reAmber B., 191 Cal. App. 3d at 685, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 626; In re Christine C., 191
Cal. App. 3d at 679, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 632; In re CherylH., 153 Cal. App. 3d at 1109, 200 Cal.
Rptr. at 795.
110. Seering, 194 Cal. App. 3d at 312, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 431.
111. 36 Cal. 3d 236, 681 P.2d 291, 203 Cal. Rptr. 450 (1984).
112. Id. at 244, 681 P.2d at 296, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 455.
113. Id. at 251, 681 P.2d at 301, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 460 (quoting State v. Saldana, 324
N.W.2d 227, 230 (Minn. 1982)).
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reference to CSAAS. In Seering v. California Department of Social Serv-
ices,114 the expert testified in two different forms. First, he stated that it
was "his opinion A. had been molested because he viewed her behavior
as consistent with the 'child sexual abuse accommodation syn-
drome.' "115 Second, he opined that the child had been molested based
on his interviews with the child and his own professional experience with
abused children. 16 The court viewed the reference to CSAAS as a new
"method of proof" analogous to that offered in Bledsoe.1 7 However, the
court found the expert's statements that were based on interviews to be
the "personal opinion" of the expert, and therefore not subject to Kelly-
Frye.1
18
With Bledsoe as precedent, the Seering court was on solid ground in
finding that the Kelly-Frye test applied to the expert's CSAAS testi-
mony1 19 because the similarity of CSAAS to the rape trauma syndrome
of Bledsoe is striking. CSAAS was not developed as a forensic, determi-
native tool.120 As with rape trauma syndrome, CSAAS serves a clinical
purpose. It is descriptive of abused children and is not designed to verify
whether the child has been abused.'21 Assuming that the use of the term
"syndrome" implies deduction based on a specific scientific process
rather than a personal opinion by the expert, the application of Kelly-
Frye here would seem to fit within the distinction between Bledsoe and
McDonald. 1
22
The more difficult issue is whether this use of CSAAS, which trig-
gers a Kelly-Frye analysis, is qualitatively different from the testimony of
experts on sexual abuse which either avoids the syndrome terminology or
describes the syndrome in general terms without reference to the child in
the case. The latter two forms of testimony are not as likely to be sub-
jected to a Kelly-Frye analysis and, yet, many of the same concerns about
overwhelming the trier of fact exist with all three forms of expert testi-
114. 194 Cal. App. 3d 298, 239 Cal. Rptr. 422 (1st Dist. 1987).
115. Id. at 306, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 427.
116. Id. at 312, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 431.
117. Id. at 311, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 430 (citing People v. Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d 18, 641 P.2d 775,
181 Cal. Rptr. 243 (1982)).
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. See infra notes 387-92 and accompanying text.
121. CSAAS may not even be an appropriate "basis" of an opinion that the child was
abused. If its use is descriptive only and not diagnostic, an expert should not rely upon it to
determine abuse. See Myers, Bays, Becker, Berliner, Corwin & Saywitz, Expert Testimony in
Child Sexual Abuse Litigation, at 92-94 (1989) (on file in Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review
Office) (due to be published in Volume 68, Nebraska Law Review) [hereinafter Myers].
122. See supra notes 93-97 and accompanying text.
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mony. The need for a consistent screening approach to all forms of ex-
pert testimony on child sexual abuse becomes more apparent in the next
section which discusses expert testimony that a child was abused without
an express reference to the syndrome.
B. Opinion That A Child was Abused with No Express
Reference to CSAAS
"In my opinion, Amy was sexually abused." This testimony is dif-
ferent in form, and possibly in its basis, from express references to
CSAAS. The form of this opinion, a conclusion that a particular child
was abused, without reference to methodology, is typical expert testi-
mony. Several California courts of appeal address the admissibility of
this testimony.123 On its face, the testimony appears to be "personal
opinion," not "scientific evidence." As personal opinion, Kelly-Frye
would not apply.'2 4 However, because it is unknown whether the opin-
ion is reliable, 2 ' the purposes for using the Kelly-Frye test are present.
In addition, a distinction between the expert who uses the term "syn-
drome" and the expert who refrains from uttering the word is often a
matter of form, not substance. The form is subject to manipulation. A
heightened admissibility standard is thus needed, but, as a consequence
of these conflicting principles, the courts of appeal are divided on
whether Kelly-Frye applies to this testimony. This section first examines
the case law from the courts of appeal. It then explores the difficulty of
distinguishing scientific evidence from personal opinion or factual testi-
mony in the child sexual abuse context and demonstrates the need for a
clearer standard.
Several courts have admitted expert testimony that a particular
child was abused without requiring satisfaction of the Kelly-Frye test.
For example, in Seering v. California Department of Social Services,'26
the court held that the expert's opinion that the child had been abused
was a personal opinion not subject to Kelly-Frye.'27 The expert in Seer-
123. See, eg., In re Heather H., 200 Cal. App. 3d 91, 246 Cal. Rptr. 38 (6th Dist. 1988);
Seering v. California Dept. of Social Servs., 194 Cal. App. 3d 298, 239 Cal. Rptr. 422 (1st Dist.
1987); In re Amber B., 191 Cal. App. 3d 682, 236 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1st Dist. 1987); In re
Christine C., 191 Cal. App. 3d 676, 236 Cal. Rptr. 630 (1st Dist. 1987); People v. Roscoe, 168
Cal. App. 3d 1093, 215 Cal. Rptr. 45 (5th Dist. 1985); In re Cheryl H., 153 Cal. App. 3d 1098,
200 Cal. Rptr. 789 (2d Dist. 1984).
124. Seering, 194 Cal. App. 3d at 314, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 430.
125. Research in the field has just begun to demonstrate that determinations that a child
was abused are reliable. See Myers, supra note 121, at 104-09.
126. 194 Cal. App. 3d 298, 239 Cal. Rptr. 422 (1st Dist. 1987).
127. Id. at 311, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 430.
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ing phrased his opinion in two ways: (1) the child's behavior was consis-
tent with CSAAS 128 and (2) the child had been sexually abused.
12 9
Although the opinion with the reference to CSAAS was found to be sub-
ject to the Kelly-Frye analysis, 130 the court held that the test was inappli-
cable to the expert's personal opinion that the child had been abused.1
31
According to the court, that opinion was not based on CSAAS, but
rather was based on the expert's interviews with the child and his knowl-
edge of the behavior of sexually abused children from his clinical experi-
ence.1 32 Thus, the latter testimony was not subject to a higher standard
of admissibility.
1 33
Other courts of appeal have held that expert testimony that a child
has been sexually abused is admissible without any reference to the Kelly-
Frye rule. In an early case, In re Cheryl H. ,134 decided in 1984, the court
approved the admission of testimony that the child's conduct was "typi-
cal of conduct exhibited by other young children who had been sexually
abused."' 13  In Cheryl H, the court's primary concern was with the po-
tentially hearsay basis of the opinion.136  Once that concern was re-
solved,1 3 1 the court found no error in admitting the opinion for
substantive purposes.1 38 The Cheryl H. decision did precede People v.
Bledsoe, 1 9 which may explain the absence of a Kelly-Frye discussion.
Another court, post-Bledsoe, admitted similar testimony without an-
alyzing the applicability of the Kelly-Frye rule. In In re Heather H,140
128. Seering, 194 Cal. App. 3d at 306, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 427; see supra note 115 and accom-
panying text.
129. 194 Cal. App. 3d at 312, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 427.
130. Id. at 311, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 430; see supra notes 114-18 and accompanying text.
131. 194 Cal. App. 3d at 311, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 430.
132. Id. at 313-14, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 431.
133. Id. at 314, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 432.
134. 153 Cal. App. 3d 1098, 200 Cal. Rptr. 789 (2d Dist. 1984).
135. Id. at 1110, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 795.
136. Id. at 1126-32, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 807-11. The opinion that the child had been abused
was based on her behavior with dolls and her statements to the expert, both potentially hear-
say. Id. at 1116, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 800. The court was also concerned with the appropriateness
of the expert's opinion that a particular person was the abuser. Id. at 1118, 200 Cal. Rptr. at
801. The court discussed whether this opinion would assist the trier of fact as well as hearsay
concerns. Id. at 1118-26, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 801-07.
137. The court found that the child's behavior with anatomically correct dolls was nonas-
sertive conduct and therefore not hearsay. Id. at 1126-28, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 807-08. The
child's statements to the expert were nonhearsay circumstantial evidence of the child's state of
mind, which was relevant to the determination of whether continued visitation with the abuser
was in the best interests of the child. Id. at 1128-32, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 808-11.
138. Id. at 1118, 1127, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 801, 807.
139. 36 Cal. 3d 236, 681 P.2d 291, 203 Cal. Rptr. 450 (1984). In re Cheryl H. was decided
on March 30, 1984. Bledsoe was decided on June 14, 1984.
140. 200 Cal. App. 3d 91, 246 Cal. Rptr. 38 (6th Dist. 1988).
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decided in 1988, the court cited only to Cheryl H. for support for the
admissibility of testimony that the child had been molested. 4 1 The court
ignored both Bledsoe and the other cases decided since Cheryl H. that
had explored the admissibility of the expert testimony using the Kelly-
Frye test.
Two other courts have also reached the opposite conclusion from
Seering, applying the Kelly-Frye test to expert testimony that a particular
child was abused. In People v. Roscoe,"42 the court held that the expert's
testimony that the victim was molested was inadmissible under the rea-
soning of Bledsoe.'43 In In re Amber B. 1' and In re Christine C.,145 the
court found that observing doll play and analyzing children's reports of
abuse constituted a new scientific method.'46 In Amber B. the court di-
rectly confronted the issue of whether testimony that a child had been
abused was personal opinion or a new scientific method of proof. 47 The
court acknowledged the difficulty in determining whether psychological
evidence is a novel method of proof.'14 Concluding that a new method
was involved with child sexual abuse testimony, the court relied on the
rationale for imposing the Kelly-Frye rule 49-- whether the trier of fact
would be misled by the "aura of infallibility" of the evidence.' 50
The critical question to the Amber B. court was would a trier of fact
"tend to ascribe an inordinately high degree of certainty to the technique
... ?,,'51 In holding that the methodology used by the expert qualified as
"'a new scientific process operating on purely psychological evi-
dence' ,1152 which the California Supreme Court, in People v. Shirley,
153
had acknowledged would require a Kelly-Frye analysis,'" 4 the court
found that the area of child sexuality was "beyond the scope of critical
141. Id. at 96-97, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 41.
142. 168 Cal. App. 3d 1093, 215 Cal. Rptr. 45 (5th Dist. 1985).
143. Id. at 1099-1100, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 49-50.
144. 191 Cal. App. 3d 682, 236 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1st Dist. 1987).
145. 191 Cal. App. 3d 676, 236 Cal. Rptr. 630 (1st Dist. 1987).
146. In reAmber B., 191 Cal. App. 3d at 691, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 629; In re Christine C., 191
Cal. App. 3d at 679, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 632.
147. In reAmber B., 191 Cal. App. 3d at 687, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 626.
148. Id. at 690, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 628. The court aptly referred to this issue as "elusive" and
commented that "one of the recognized weaknesses of the Kelly-Frye test is the difficulty in
defining what types of evidence should be classified as scientific." Id.
149. Id., 236 Cal. Rptr. at 629.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 691, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 629.
152. Id. (quoting People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 53, 723 P.2d 1354, 1374-75, 181 Cal.
Rptr. 243, 264 (1982)).
153. 31 Cal. 3d 18, 723 P.2d 1354, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243 (1982).
154. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d at 53, 641 P.2d at 795, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 264.
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analysis by the average lay person. 15 5 Because of the lack of under-
standing by laypersons of this area, the court found that the expert's tes-
timony would be given an "aura of infallibility" and that triers of fact
could not bring a "healthy skepticism" to their analysis of the expert's
opinion. 156 The Christine C. opinion relied upon the reasoning of the
Amber B. court.
15 7
The courts of appeal have therefore taken differing approaches. Is
one approach, or result, more appropriate than another under the stan-
dards set forth in the California Supreme Court decisions? The Cheryl
H. and Heather H. approach of ignoring the Kelly-Frye test'5 8 only ar-
guably reaches the right result in admitting the expert testimony if the
conclusion is correct that the testimony is personal opinion. The Seering
and Amber B./Christine C. courts were more forthright in facing the is-
sue.'59 When the expert testifies that the child has been molested, is the
expert's testimony personal opinion or a novel method of proof? Should
the answer depend upon the basis of the opinion? If the basis is observa-
tion of play with anatomically correct dolls, is there a reason to apply
Kelly-Frye that does not exist if the basis is interviews and observation of
other behaviors? Is there a reason to distinguish an opinion explicitly
stated to be based on CSAAS from one based on CSAAS but where the
witness does not reveal his or her reliance on the syndrome? Would it be
better to analyze the testimony by looking to the purpose of the Kelly-
Frye rule? These issues are considered next.
On the surface, an opinion'that a child has been abused, without use
of the term "syndrome," would appear to be "personal opinion" and not
expert testimony based on a novel method of proof. Following the ra-
tionale of People v. McDonald,"6 the "aura of infallibility" which at-
taches to a scientific technique does not exist where the expert merely
states his or her own opinion. 6' It is arguable that, as in McDonald, the
triers of fact, especially jurors would be able to view such personal opin-
155. In reAmberB., 191 Cal. App. 3d at 691, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 629.
156. Id.
157. In re Christine C., 191 Cal. App. 3d at 679-80, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 632. A federal court
has relied on In re Amber B. and In re Christine C. to hold Frye applicable to an opinion based
on anatomical dolls. In United States v. Gillespie, 852 F.2d 475 (9th Cir. 1988), the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found that the use of anatomically correct dolls in arriving at an
opinion that the child had been abused by a man rather than a woman constituted a novel
scientific technique. Id. at 480-81. See also In re Christie D., 206 Cal. App. 3d 469, 253 Cal.
Rptr. 619 (5th Dist. 1988).
158. See supra notes 134-41 and accompanying text.
159. See supra notes 126-33 and 144-57 and accompanying text.
160. 37 Cal. 3d 351, 690 P.2d 709, 208 Cal. Rptr. 236 (1984).
161. Id. at 372, 690 P.2d at 724, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 251.
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ion with a "healthy skepticism" which obviates the need to invoke Kelly-
Frye to protect them from being overwhelmed by scientific evidence. 62
On the other hand, there seems little logic in labeling syndrome tes-
timony as a new "process" while labeling a new diagnosis based on a
collection of symptoms "personal opinion." For example, in McDonald,
the court viewed Munchausen's syndrome by proxy as a "diagnosis of an
unusual form of mental illness" and not as a new method for diagnosing
a mental illness.163 If Munchausen's had truly been a new identification
of a mental illness,"' it would be no different from using CSAAS as a
diagnostic device. 6 Even assuming the word "syndrome" was elimi-
nated from Munchausen's, the collection of a new group of symptoms
could be said to constitute a novel "theory" upon which the expert was
basing an opinion. The new theory or method should then be subjected
to a Kelly-Frye analysis. To distinguish the expert who expressly refers
to CSAAS from one who concludes a child was sexually abused based on
the behavioral reactions of the child elevates form over substance. To
avoid Kelly-Frye, the expert referring to CSAAS would merely have to
modify the testimony to state that in his or her opinion the child was
abused in part on the basis of a behavioral pattern of secrecy, helpless-
ness, denial, delayed disclosure, and retraction which, deduced from the
expert's clinical experience, typify abused children. These symptoms are,
of course, what constitute CSAAS.' 66 To apply Kelly-Frye only when
the word "syndrome" is used is meaningless.
There has also been an attempt to distinguish opinion based on ana-
tomical doll play from opinion based on interviews and clinical experi-
ence. Under that distinction, Kelly-Frye applies to the first opinion but
not to the second. In Seering, for example, the court attempted to distin-
guish the bases in Amber B. and Christine C. (doll play and interviews)
from that employed in Seering 167 (interviews and clinical experience). In
a virtually inexplicable paragraph, the court stated that it viewed its
holding that Kelly-Frye was inapplicable "as consistent with the views
expressed in Amber B. and Christine C.," where Kelly-Frye was ap-.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 373, 690 P.2d at 724, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 251.
164. The court in People v. Phillips, 122 Cal. App. 3d 69, 86 n.2, 175 Cal. Rptr. 703, 714
n.2 (1st Dist. 1981), noted that Munchausen's syndrome was listed in more recent editions of
the AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS (3d ed. 1980) [hereinafter DSM-III].
165. See supra note .121. The use of CSAAS as a diagnostic tool may be inappropriate
under any circumstances.
166. Summit, The Child Sexual Abuse Accomodation Syndrome, 7 INT'L J. OF CHILD
ABUSE & NEGLECT 177 (1983); see supra notes 105-06 and accompanying text.
167. Seering, 194 Cal. App. 3d at 310-11, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 430.
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plied.168 The court probably was distinguishing between the use of ana-
tomically correct dolls as a new method of proof requiring a Kelly-Frye
analysis, and a clinical judgment based only upon experience and verbal
interviews which would be exempt from Kelly-Frye.
1 69
There is some appeal to this distinction. Doll play is arguably more
like putting the child through a "machine" and noting the regult than
other observations of behavior by the expert. It is easily tagged as a
"process" or "method" for determining abuse. The doll play observa-
tions could also be viewed as creating more of an "aura of infallibility"
than an opinion that the child was abused based on statements and other
behaviors of the child. However, the expert's analysis of the child's state-
ments and other nonverbal behaviors is also a "method" for determining
abuse. The critical question is whether the opinion of abuse is reliable,
regardless of the bases for the opinion. If the opinion is unreliable, the
dangers associated with scientific evidence exist. Moreover, if Kelly-
Frye's heightened admissiblity standard applies only to the opinion that
the child was abused based on doll play, the expert can once again ma-
nipulate the testimony to be a "personal opinion."
One court tried to overcome the arbitrariness of the personal opin-
ion-scientific evidence distinction by applying Kelly-Frye if the testimony
exuded an "aura of infallibility" such that the trier of fact would "tend to
ascribe a high degree of certainty to the technique. ' 170 The court admi-
168. Id. at 314, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 432.
169. It is also possible that the court was expressing its consistency with the "view" in
Amber B. that there is a distinction between personal opinion and a new scientific method even
though the court did not agree with the result reached in Amber B. and Christine C. The
Seering court stated, for example:
Although the court in Amber B. and Christine C.... spoke broadly in terms of
subjecting psychological or psychiatric analyses of a child's reports of sexual abuse to
the Kelly-Frye test of admissibility, it appears to us from a reading of those cases,
including the distinction made between an expert's own personal opinion and an
opinion based upon a scientific method of proof, that the court intended to subject
expert opinion testimony to the Kelly-Frye rule only when the opinion was based
upon a new method of proof of fact rather than being a personal opinion based upon
the expert's own experience.
Id.
It seems unlikely, however, that the Seering court disagreed with the application of Kelly-
Frye in Amber B. and Christine C. in light of language earlier in the opinion. The court stated
that the expert's opinion based on CSAAS "is sufficiently analogous to the methods of proof
relied upon in Bledsoe, Amber B., and Christine C. to require that it be subjected to the Kelly-
Frye standard of admissibility." Id. at 311, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 430. The court subjected the
opinion based on CSAAS to a Kelly-Frye nalysis. See supra notes 114-22 and accompanying
text. Thus, the court must be distinguishing Seering from Amber B and Christine C. on the
basis that in the latter two cases play with anatomically correct dolls was a basis of the expert's
opinion.
170. In reAmber B., 191 Cal. App. 3d at 691, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 629.
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rably attempted to determine if there was a need for a heightened admis-
sibility standard instead of applying a rote test.1 71 Although the
approach of looking to the purpose of the Kelly-Frye rule does create a
rational conceptual theme, the "aura of infallibility" language would
cause confusion under existing case law. For example, the court in Am-
ber B. found that childhood sexuality was a subject that the trier of fact
could not easily analyze, requiring a heightened standard of admissibility
for expert testimony. 172
In contrast, the California Supreme Court viewed expert eyewitness
identification testimony in McDonald as a topic that jurors could analyze
with "healthy skepticism." 173 Is there more mystique in childhood sexu-
ality than in the functioning of the human brain? This aura of infallibil-
ity approach will either lead to some very arbitrary distinctions or to
applying Kelly-Frye to most psychological testimony. Where the basis of
most psychological testimony is a subjective evaluation of the verbal and
nonverbal behavior of an individual, the trier of fact may seldom be faced
with unraveling the mysteries of a machine. And yet, the typical jury
will possess very little ability to question critically an expert's judgment
that an individual suffers from a disorder (like Munchausen's) with
which he or she has no familiarity.
The real problem is that the Kelly-Frye standard does not fit psycho-
logical testimony. The language of Kelly-Frye-a technique, process, de-
vice, or novel method of proof' 74-does not readily describe new
diagnoses in the psychological field. Even the language of Frye itself-a
new principle or discovery 75 -seems to imply the physical sciences. A
more helpful analysis would determine whether there is a reason to sub-
ject the opinion evidence in question to heightened scrutiny before it is
admitted and, if it should be, what standards should be applied to that
type of expert testimony.
C. General Behavior Patterns of Sexually Abused Children
"Children who have been abused will often delay in reporting the
incident to an adult." "When very young children describe or demon-
strate intercourse, they probably learned it from experience and not from
171. Id.
172. Id. at 691, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 629; see supra text accompanying notes 150-56.
173. McDonald, 37 Cal. 3d at 372, 690 P.2d at 724, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 251; see supra note 67
and accompanying text.
174. See supra notes 53-97 and accompanying text.
175. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
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age-appropriate sex exploration." '176 Generalized testimony by an expert
in this form as rehabilitative evidence1 7 7 is the least likely type of expert
testimony to trigger a Kelly-Frye debate. The courts primarily rely upon
the People v. Bledsoe 178 dictum that approved the use of rape trauma
syndrome characteristics to combat "widely held misconceptions about
rape and rape victims. ' ' 179  By analogy, the use of CSAAS or typical
symptoms to rebut common misconceptions about child abuse victims is
arguably appropriate. There is also support in the McDonald case.180 A
mere description of the research in the field is possibly not an "opinion"
at all, but factual. If the testimony does not constitute an opinion, none
of the rules on expert opinion testimony, including the Kelly-Frye stan-
dard, would apply."' 1 An analogy to the McDonald court's alternative
theory, that the expert's description of the literature and evaluation of
factors affecting child abuse victims in the particular case is "personal
opinion" rather than scientific evidence,"8 2 similarly would render the
Kelly-Frye test inapplicable."' 3
There are serious theoretical problems, however, in excluding gener-
alized testimony for a nonrehabilitative purpose"8 4 unless Kelly-Frye has
been applied. The courts of appeal that have excluded such testimony
have almost unanimously relied upon Bledsoe."18 They have valiantly
176. This example paraphrases the expert testimony in In re Amber B., 191 Cal. App. 3d
682, 685, 236 Cal. Rptr. 623, 625 (1st Dist. 1987).
177. Evidence serves a rehabilitative function when its purpose is to restore a witness' credi-
bility which has come under attack. A witness' credibility can be challenged either on cross-
examination of that witness or through direct testimony by witnesses called by the opposing
party. The rehabilitative evidence is consequently appropriate at several phases of the proceed-
ing. If, for instance, the victim in a criminal case, called during the state's case-in-chief, is
impeached on cross-examination by the defense, the state would be entitled to rehabilitate her
by her own testimony on redirect, by calling another witness during its case-in-chief, or by
calling another witness in its rebuttal to the defense's case-in-chief.
178. 36 Cal. 3d 236, 681 P.2d 291, 203 Cal. Rptr. 450 (1984).
179. Id. at 247, 681 P.2d at 298, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 457.
180. 37 Cal. 3d 351, 366, 690 P.2d 709, 719, 208 Cal. Rptr. 236, 246 (1984).
181. Id.
182. Id. at 372, 690 P.2d at 724, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 251.
183. See supra notes 64-67 and 74-77 and accompanying text regarding the McDonald
court's reasoning why Kelly-Frye does not apply to personal opinion.
184. If testimony is not rehabilitative, it must be probative of one of the essential elements
of the cause of action, such as whether the child was in fact abused.
185. See, eg., People v. Jeff, 204 Cal. App. 3d 309, 251 Cal. Rptr. 135 (5th Dist. 1988);
People v. Bowker, 203 Cal. App. 3d 385, 249 Cal. Rptr. 886 (4th Dist. 1988); In re Sara M.,
194 Cal. App. 3d 585, 239 Cal. Rptr. 605 (3d Dist. 1987). But see People v. Gray, 187 Cal.
App. 3d 213, 231 Cal. Rptr. 658 (2d Dist. 1986). Gray is the lone exception. There the court
noted the similarity between the generalized testimony on child sexual abuse and the genera-
lized testimony in McDonald. Id. at 219, 231 Cal. Rptr. at 661. The Gray court additionally
found Kelly-Frye inapplicable because the testimony was rehabilitative and thus, according to
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attempted to be consistent with the dictum of Bledsoe that the syndrome
testimony is admissible because it rehabilitates the victim after an attack
by the defense. 86 These courts consequently have distinguished between
generalized testimony on traits of abused children offered to rebut a chal-
lenge to the child's credibility and generalized testimony offered for the
purpose of inferring that the child has been abused. The distinction,
which results in excluding the testimony from the case-in-chief unless it
has a rehabilitative function, is only valid, however, if the Kelly-Frye
standard is applicable.
This section first discusses case law from the courts of appeal, and
then the rationale for admitting generalized testimony for a rehabilitative
purpose. Next, the theoretical difficulties under current California law in
excluding generalized testimony for a nonrehabilitative purpose are ana-
lyzed; the discussion explores whether such testimony is "factual," "per-
sonal opinion," or "scientific evidence." The section concludes that the
distinctions under existing law obscure the critical question of whether
the judge should screen the evidence for reliability before its
introduction.
1. The decisional law
The courts considering the issue have prohibited under Kelly-Frye
generalized testimony offered in the prosecution's case-in-chief before a
rehabilitative purpose exists.' 8 7 The courts equate this testimony to an
opinion that a particular child was abused. Moreover, the opinions
barred have included syndrome and nonsyndrome testimony. For exam-
ple, in People v. Jeff,18 the prosecution first elicited a description of the
victim's behavior and statements from a lay witness.'89 The prosecution
then called an expert to verify that typical victims respond to abuse with
the same reactions as the actual victims exhibited. 9 The expert testified
both in terms of the syndrome and in nonsyndrome terms about typical
behavior patterns of abused children, such as having nightmares.' 9 l Re-
versing the conviction, the court found this testimony inconsistent with
the court, fell within the parameters outlined inBledsoe. Id. at 218, 231 Cal. Rptr. at 661. See
infra notes 213-18 and accompanying text for a discussion of Gray.
186. See Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d at 249-51, 681 P.2d at 299-301, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 459-60.
187. See, eg., People v. Jeff, 204 Cal. App. 3d 309, 251 Cal. Rptr. 135 (5th Dist. 1988);
People v. Bowker, 203 Cal. App. 3d 385, 249 Cal. Rptr. 886 (4th Dist. 1988); In re Sara M.,
194 Cal. App. 3d 585, 239 Cal. Rptr. 605 (3d Dist. 1987).
188. 204 Cal. App. 3d 309, 251 Cal. Rptr. 135 (5th Dist. 1988).
189. Id. at 319, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 140-41. The court noted that most of this testimony was
probably inadmissible hearsay. Id. at 339, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 153.
190. Id. at 320-21, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 140-41.
191. Id. at 338-39, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 153.
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the rehabilitative purpose condoned in Bledsoe and its progeny.192 The
court viewed this testimony as an opinion that the specific child "fits the
mold" of a sexually abused child.193 The court found this to be thinly
disguised testimony that the particular victim was abused, which runs
afoul of Bledsoe. 94
Another court of appeal, in In re Sara M., 195 similarly found that
Kelly-Frye would preclude introducing generalized syndrome testimony
in the state's case-in-chief. 196 The court determined that this use of de-
scriptive testimony was introduced for the purpose of demonstrating that
the particular child had been abused197 and could not withstand a Kelly-
Frye challenge.
198
In People v. Bowker,199 another court of appeal held that generalized
syndrome testimony used to imply that the victim had been abused did
not meet Kelly-Frye.2 °° The Bowker court interpreted Bledsoe as prohib-
iting syndrome testimony where it is used as a "predictor" of child
abuse.2 °1 The court noted that the danger of jury misuse of the testi-
mony might even be greater where generalized testimony is presented
rather than an opinion directly stating the expert's view of the specific
child.20 2 In particular, the court noted that, although the expert spoke in
192. Id. at 337-38, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 152-53.
193. Id. at 338, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 153.
194. Id.
195. 194 Cal. App. 3d 585, 239 Cal. Rptr. 605 (3d Dist. 1987).
196. Id. at 592, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 609.
197. Id., 239 Cal. Rptr. at 610. The court stated that, on the basis that the introduction of
the evidence in the state's case-in-chief and the state's "contention on appeal that a psycholo-
gist may testify that the child was sexually abused and exhibits behavior consistent with chil-
dren who have been sexually abused .... the purpose of the evidence with reference to the
child molest syndrome tendered in the court below was to show that this child had been sexu-
ally abused." Id.
198. Id. at 594, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 611.
199. 203 Cal. App. 3d 385, 249 Cal. Rptr. 886 (4th Dist. 1988).
200. Id. at 395, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 892. The court ultimately held, however, that the error
was harmless. Id.
201. Id. at 393, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 891.
202. The court stated:
While the impropriety [in using CSAAS as a predictor] is clearest where the expert's
testimony applies the CSAAS theory to the facts of the case and concludes that the
victim was molested, it is also present where the expert gives "general" testimony
describing the components of the syndrome in such a way as to allow the jury to
apply the syndrome to the facts of the case and conclude the child was sexually
abused. In fact, there may be more danger where the application is left to the jury
because the jurors' education and training may not have sensitized them to the dan-
gers of drawing predictive conclusions. The expert may be aware that although vic-
tims of child abuse generally exhibit a particular type of behavior, that behavior is
also found in significant numbers of children who have not been molested. The jury
may not be similarly cognizant.
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general terms, his factual examples were analogous to the facts pertaining
to the victims in the case.2"3 This testimony created a" 'scientific' frame-
work"2" for the jury. All the jurors had to do was to plug in the facts of
the case.205
On the other hand, some courts of appeal have admitted generalized
testimony with a rehabilitative purpose without so much as a discussion
of Kelly-Frye.206 The Bowker court indicated that generalized testimony
would be admissible in those situations where the jury is likely to assume
a "'myth' or 'misconception' "207 about the child's testimony, such as
assuming no abuse where a child delays in reporting the abuse or re-
cants.20 s In People v. Roscoe,209 the court similarly indicated that genera-
lized testimony regarding typical behaviors of victims of sexual abuse,
used as rehabilitation, would be admissible on the basis of Bledsoe with-
out an independent discussion of Kelly-Frye.210 These courts appear to
203. Id. at 394, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 892.
204. Id. at 394.
205. Id.
206. See People v. Bowker, 203 Cal. App. 3d 385, 249 Cal. Rptr. 886 (4th Dist. 1988); In re
Sara M., 194 Cal. App. 3d 585, 591, 239 Cal. Rptr. 605, 609 (3d Dist. 1987); People v. Roscoe,
168 Cal. App. 3d 1093, 215 Cal. Rptr. 45 (5th Dist. 1985).
207. Bowker, 203 Cal. App. 3d at 394, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 891.
208. Id. at 394, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 892. A concurring judge would have found that the
testimony did serve a rehabilitative purpose even though offered in the state's case-in-chief
because the child had testified inconsistently. Id. at 401 & n.3, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 896 & n.3
(Benke, J., concurring).
209. 168 Cal. App. 3d 1093, 215 Cal. Rptr. 45 (5th Dist. 1985).
210. Id. at 1099-1100, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 49-50 (citing People v. Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d 236, 681
P.2d 291, 203 Cal. Rptr. 450 (1984)). The court rejected an argument, however, that testi-
mony regarding a specific victim should be admissible to rehabilitate. Id. The court viewed
the issue of whether the rehabilitative testimony had to be generalized or could be victim-
specific as an open question after Bledsoe. Id. at 1099, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 49 (citing People v.
Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d 236, 681 P.2d 291, 203 Cal. Rptr. 450 (1984)).
More recently, in People v. Luna, 204 Cal. App. 3d 726, 250 Cal. Rptr. 878 (5th Dist.
1988), the court of appeal specifically approved use of generalized CSAAS testimony in the
prosecution's case-in-chief. Although there is insufficient information in the case to tell if the
testimony served a rehabilitative purpose even though introduced in the case-in-chief, the
court viewed the testimony on symptoms exhibited by sexual abuse victims in general as an
application of the dictum in Bledsoe. Id. at 736-37, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 883. This would indicate
that the court found the testimony to be rehabilitative in nature.
It is also interesting to note that the court in Luna viewed the expert as giving generalized
testimony when he described typical symptoms, even though the same expert had also testified
that the specific victim in the case had physical trauma consistent with abuse. Id. Although
concerned about the possibility that the jury would assume the expert was discussing the spe-
cific victim when he subsequently gave the generalized testimony, the court thought that the
jury had been adequately advised that the generalized testimony did not indicate an opinion on
the victim. Id. The court did suggest, however, that, in a similar situation in the future, the
expert should testify in two segments. Id. at 737, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 884. In order to help
differentiate the purposes of each part of his testimony, he should give his victim-specific testi-
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assume that CSAAS or other generalized testimony is generally accepted
within the relevant scientific community as was rape trauma syndrome in
Bledsoe. 
211
Two courts of appeal have specifically found that the Kelly-Frye test
does not apply to generalized testimony on sexual abuse offered to reha-
bilitate the victim. 212 In People v. Gray,213 for example, the court held the
Kelly-Frye test inapplicable to testimony describing CSAAS factors in
general.214 The expert's testimony arose after evidence was admitted
that the child had delayed in reporting the abuse and had then failed to
immediately disclose all the sexual episodes when she did report the
abuse to an adult.21 5 The court analogized to the personal opinion testi-
mony on eyewitness identification in McDonald216 and to the language in
Bledsoe2 7 on rebutting misconceptions. The court held Kelly-Frye inap-
plicable where the evidence was not introduced to prove that sexual
abuse occurred to the particular victim.
218
2. Rehabilitative use of generalized testimony
In holding generalized testimony admissible for rehabilitative pur-
poses, the appellate courts are consistent with the result suggested by the
Bledsoe dictum. The generalized testimony about either CSAAS charac-
teristics or simply typical behavior of abused children is analogous to the
testimony about rape victim characteristics which the Bledsoe court sug-
gested would be appropriate rehabilitative evidence. 219 The courts have
not, however, spelled out their rationale for admitting such testimony-is
it personal opinion, factual, or scientific evidence that meets Kelly-Frye?
Generalized testimony for a rehabilitative purpose is probably ad-
missible under all three conceptual approaches. If reciting literature is
mony and be subject to cross-examination on it and then he should give his generalized testi-
mony with cross-examination following. Id.
211. 36 Cal. 3d at 251, 681 P.2d at 301, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 460.
212. People v. Gray, 187 Cal. App. 3d 213, 231 Cal. Rptr. 658 (2d Dist. 1986); People v.
Dunnahoo, 152 Cal. App. 3d 561, 199 Cal. Rptr. 796 (2d Dist. 1984).
213. 187 Cal. App. 3d 213, 231 Cal. Rptr. 658 (2d Dist. 1986).
214. Id. at 219-20, 231 Cal. Rptr. at 661-62; see also Dunnahoo, 152 Cal. App. 3d at 577,
199 Cal. Rptr. at 804 (two police officers qualified as experts on child molestation and court
approved their testimony that children delay in reporting abuse solely under California Evi-
dence Code section 801).
215. Gray, 187 Cal. App. 3d at 218, 231 Cal. Rptr. at 660-61.
216. Id. at 219-20, 231 Cal. Rptr. at 661-62.
217. Id. at 219, 231 Cal. Rptr. at 661 (citing People v. McDonald, 37 Cal. 3d 351, 690 P.2d
709, 208 Cal. Rptr. 236 (1984)).
218. Id. at 219-20, 231 Cal. Rptr. at 661-62 (citing People v. Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d 236, 681
P.2d 291, 203 Cal. Rptr. 450 (1984)).
219. See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text.
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viewed as factual, then no restrictions on expert testimony would apply
and the evidence would be readily admissible.220 If the testimony is ex-
pert opinion, but personal, Kelly-Frye is inapplicable and the testimony
must merely assist the trier of fact in understanding the behavior at issue
in the case.221 If the testimony is scientific evidence, therefore subject to
Kelly-Frye, it may well meet that standard as did the rehabilitative testi-
mony in Bledsoe.222 There probably is general acceptance of CSAAS or
of its typical characteristics for the purpose of explaining a child's delay
in reporting or retracting.
223
3. Nonrehabilitative use of generalized testimony
The difficult question arises when generalized testimony is intro-
duced to support the inference that the child was abused in the case-in-
chief. This testimony probably cannot meet the Kelly-Frye standard.2
Thus, the courts of appeal are correctly applying the Kelly-Frye test
when they exclude the testimony.2 However, is it appropriate to apply
Kelly-Frye? If the generalized testimony is personal opinion, there is no
need to apply Kelly-Frye because under the McDonald reasoning the trier
of fact can be skeptical of the testimony. 26 We once again are faced with
the dilemma of whether the testimony is more like the eyewitness identi-
fication testimony in McDonald or like the rape trauma syndrome testi-
mony in Bledsoe.2" Presumably, if the syndrome term is used, the
testimony would trigger Kelly-Frye as in Bledsoe.22 1 However, if the ex-
pert testifies to characteristics of abused children without using the syn-
drome, the testimony is analogous to the generalized testimony in
McDonald which was not subjected to Kelly-Frye.229 If the generalized
220. McDonald, 37 Cal. 3d at 361-67, 690 P.2d at 715-19, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 242-46.
221. See supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text.
222. Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d at 247, 681 P.2d at 298, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 457.
223. CSAAS was developed as a description of abused children. See supra notes 105-06 and
accompanying text. However, even the description is criticized as being based on the assump-
tion that the children were abused. See infra notes 390-91 and accompanying text.
224. See infira notes 387-95 and accompanying text.
225. People v. Bowker, 203 Cal. App. 3d 385, 249 Cal. Rptr. 886 (4th Dist. 1988); In re
Sara M., 194 Cal. App. 3d 213, 231 Cal. Rptr. 605 (3d Dist. 1987); see supra notes 193-205 and
accompanying text.
226. McDonald, 37 Cal. 3d at 372, 690 P.2d at 724, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 251; see supra notes
64-67 and accompanying text.
227. Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d at 247, 681 P.2d at 298, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 457; see supra notes 84-88
and accompanying text.
228. McDonald, 37 Cal. 3d at 372-73, 690 P.2d at 723-24, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 250-51; Bledsoe,
36 Cal. 3d at 246, 681 P.2d at 298, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 457.
229. McDonald, 37 Cal. 3d at 372-73, 690 P.2d at 723-24, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 250-52; see
supra notes 72-75 and accompanying text.
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testimony is personal opinion, there is no reason to exclude the evidence
from the case-in-chief on the basis of expert opinion rules.230  The
Bowker, Roscoe/Jeff and Sara M. courts would thus be in error. Treat-
ing the generalized testimony as personal opinion, however, triggers the
same criticism that applies to opinions that a particular child was
abused-form is elevated over substance if only syndrome testimony is
excludable.23'
Alternatively, the Kelly-Frye test could be unnecessary because the
generalized testimony might be factual, not opinion. For example, the
expert may just be describing the literature when he or she states that the
literature says children delay in reporting abuse. The McDonald court
toyed with the possibility that the expert testimony on eyewitness identi-
fication was a factual description.232 As fact, instead of opinion, the evi-
dence does not have to meet the proper-subject test for expert testimony
of being beyond the common experience of the trier of fact.233 If the
testimony is viewed as factual, there would be no basis under the rules on
expert testimony, including Kelly-Frye,234 to exclude it from the case-in-
chief.
However, labeling generalized expert testimony as factual is illogi-
cal. The use of the expert to recite literature implies that the expert be-
lieves that the literature is correct. The use of a psychological expert on
CSAAS implies that, in the expert's opinion, abused children do delay in
reporting abuse or recant their assertions. The "factual" nature of the
testimony is thus deceptive-its purpose is to convey what the expert
thinks.
Moreover, testimony by someone with expertise is critical. If it were
not critical, all that is needed is someone who has read the literature and
230. It has been argued, however, that the nonrehabilitative use of the generalized testi-
mony does not "assist the trier" under California Evidence Code section 801 because the opin-
ion is designed solely to indicate the child is credible, a function typically left to jurors and
considered inappropriate for expert opinion. See, eg., Roscoe, 168 Cal. App. 3d at 1099-1100,
215 Cal. Rptr. at 49-50; 3 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE: COMMENTARY
ON RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR THE UNITED STATES COURTS AND STATE COURTS 702[02],
at 109 (Supp. 1988). It has also been argued that an entirely hearsay basis of the opinion is not
a basis "reasonably relied upon" by such experts pursuant to section 801(b). See CAL. EVID.
CODE § 801(b) (West 1966). The testimony could run afoul of other evidence rules as well.
For instance, the use of the expert testimony may be impermissible bolstering of the victim's
credibility in the case-in-chief, even if expert testimony on credibility was appropriate.
231. See supra notes 163-66 and accompanying text.
232. See McDonald, 37 Cal. 3d at 366, 690 P.2d at 719, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 246.
233. Id.
234. These rules would include not only the subject-matter rule discussed in McDonald, but
also the qualifications requirement and the Kelly-Frye rule. See supra text accompanying notes
14-22.
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who can repeat it. What would be the result if the proponent called a
high school student to read the literature on eyewitness identification or
CSAAS? Surely there is a reason why the proponent of the evidence calls
an expert. If there had been a challenge to the expert's qualifications in
McDonald, it seems unlikely that the court would have waived the re-
quirement that a qualified expert testify, even where the testimony was
descriptive, despite the fact that the evidence rule regulating experts re-
fers only to expert "opinion. 235 The eyewitness identification expert
was well-qualified.236 This intuitive need to present a qualified expert for
descriptive testimony further indicates that such testimony needs to be
regulated as much as opinion testimony.
In addition, as noted by the Jeff, Bowker and Sara M. courts, the
purpose of generalized testimony without a rehabilitative purpose in the
case-in-chief is to imply that the particular child was abused.237 This
suggests that the inference with regard to the particular child takes the
generalized testimony out of the realm of factual testimony and into the
realm of opinion. The message is conveyed to the trier of fact that this
expert must think that, if the child has the characteristics described, the
child was abused. This would be particularly true if the expert testified
to characteristics of importance in the particular case. However, a simi-
lar inference must necessarily have been suggested in McDonald as well.
The reason to introduce the eyewitness identification testimony in the
defense's case-in-chief was to trigger an inference that the state's wit-
nesses suffered from one or more defects in perception.238 In fact, the
expert in McDonald would have commented on facts directly pertaining
to the case at hand.239 The McDonald court did not address the ramifica-
tions of its "factual-opinion" distinction because it relied on the alterna-
tive theory that the testimony was personal opinion. 2' Assuming the
McDonald court would have alternatively admitted the eyewitness identi-
fication testimony as factual, it is virtually impossible to reconcile the
235. See CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 801, 805 (West 1966).
236. McDonald, 37 Cal. 3d at 361; 690 P.2d at 715; 208 Cal. Rptr. at 242.
237. See Jeff, 204 Cal. App. 3d at 337-39, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 152-54; Bowker, 203 Cal. App.
3d at 391-94, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 889-91; In reSara M, 194 Cal. App. 3d at 592, 239 Cal. Rptr.
at 610.
238. McDonald, 37 Cal. 3d at 361, 690 P.2d at 715, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 242.
239. Id. at 362, 690 P.2d at 716, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 243.
240. Id. at 367-73, 690 P.2d at 719-24, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 246-51. The court found that,
assuming the testimony was opinion, the subject matter was "'sufficiently beyond common
experience,'" id. at 369, 690 P.2d at 721, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 248, and that Kelly-Frye was
inapplicable to "personal opinion." Id. at 372-73, 690 P.2d at 723-24, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 250-
51.
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admission of factual testimony with the exclusion of the generalized testi-
mony in the state's case-in-chief in child sexual abuse cases.
Focusing on the purposes of the Kelly-Frye rule24 1 would provide a
first step towards a sound analytical basis for the admission of genera-
lized testimony about child abuse victims. It is possible under this ap-
proach to reach the same conslusion as the courts of appeal: generalized
testimony serving a rehabilitative purpose is admissible, but precluded
when introduced for a nonrehabilitative purpose. One would argue that
there is less of an "aura" or tendency to overweight the expert's testi-
mony when it is explaining a behavior under attack, such as a delay in
reporting abuse, than when it is introduced to directly infer a child was
abused. In the nonrehabilitative situation, the trier of fact might be in-
clined to find abuse because an expert is describing symptoms of abused
children which are identical to the behavior of the child in the case. The
expert assumes a determinative role. In a rehabilitative posture, on the
other hand, the trier of fact might be more likely to view the expert's
testimony in a supportive, rather than determinative light. The primary
evidence of abuse would not be the expert, but other lay witnesses. The
expert's purpose in rebutting specific misconceptions would be more lim-
ited than when testimony is offered solely for the purpose of inferring
abuse.
Although the approach of looking to the purposes of the Kelly-Frye
rule is more meaningful than a personal opinion-scientific evidence anal-
ysis, it is still an incomplete analysis. One of the primary reasons to ad-
mit rehabilitative evidence is the need for the evidence. In a typical
criminal setting, the prosecution needs to counter a defense argument,
such as a delay in reporting indicates no abuse occurred, that appeals to
common sense but is a misunderstanding of the psychological dynamic of
abuse. The concern with confusion of the trier of fact by expert testi-
mony is less significant when the defense has triggered the need for the
testimony. Thus, the Kelly-Frye test is too limited for two reasons. First,
a need for heightened scrutiny by the judge may exist whether the ex-
pert's testimony is technically personal opinion rather than scientific evi-
dence. Second, there are other factors important to a determination of
admissibility other than the general acceptance of the principle or
method, such as the need for the testimony in a particular trial. The next
section presents an alternative to the Kelly-Frye test that is designed to
remedy these problems; the final section then evaluates the helpfulness of
the new approach in resolving admissibility issues.
241. See supra notes 23-32 and accompanying text.
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V. AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE KELLY-FRYE TEST
This section proposes adoption of the traditional or "relevancy" test
as an alternative to the Kelly-Frye test.242 It is the most comprehensive
and workable alternative and courts have recently begun to apply it.
243
A number of persuasive writers espouse a traditional analysis in lieu
of Kelly-Frye.244 To adopt a traditional analysis is to abandon Kelly-Frye
as a mandatory requirement for admissibility.245 Instead, under a tradi-
tional analysis, admissibility is determined under usual evidentiary meth-
ods. The relevance or probativeness of the evidence is first assessed. 46
Because an expert witness is involved, it must also be determined if the
242. Many other alternatives have been proposed as well. See McCord, Expert Psychologi-
cal Testimony About Child Complainants in Sexual Abuse Prosecutions: A Foray into the Ad-
missibility of Novel Psychological Evidence, 77 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1 (1986).
Professor McCord has proposed an analysis using more generalized factors than the traditional
analysis discussed here. His analysis consists of four factors: necessity, reliability, understand-
ability and importance. Id. at 31. As with relevancy analysis, these factors are analyzed by the
court to determine if the expert testimony will "assist" the jury. Id.
The necessity factor is broken down into four "sub-inquiries." Id. These are: (1) whether
the matter is beyond common knowledge; (2) whether the testimony is needed to counter
irrational prejudices in ordinary jurors' minds; (3) whether the testimony is needed because
particular facts in the case were emphasized by the opponent and thus need explanation; and
(4) whether the testimony is needed to counter jury instructions that perhaps reinforce or
overemphasize unfounded beliefs. Id. The reliability factor is essentially the Frye test. It
looks to the general acceptance of the expert's conclusion and the error rate of the technique.
Id. at 31-32.
The understandability factor copes with the problem of jurors being overwhelmed by an
aura of infallibility. Id. McCord proposes five "sub-inquiries": (1) how much the testimony is
out of the common experience of jurors; (2) the "clarity and simplicity" of the conclusions; (3)
the availability of a pool of experts for the opponent; (4) availability of literature that the
opponent can study; and (5) the likelihood of overwhelming the jury with the testimony. Id. at
32-33. The importance factor looks to whether the testimony is dispositive of the cause of
action. Id. at 33. The more important the testimony is to the case, the more dangerous the
testimony if it scores low on the other factors. Id.
See also Giannelli, supra note 33, at 1247. Professor Giannelli has criticized the relevancy
approach as too leniently admitting scientific evidence. He expressed concern that the value of
Frye not be lost-that there be adequate safeguards "against the misuse of unreliable novel
scientific evidence." Id. at 1245. He proposed that the Frye test be modified to incorporate a
burden-of-proof standard. In particular, he proposed that in criminal cases, the proponent
meet a preponderance standard. Id. at 1248. In his view, the Frye standard is inappropriately
a substantive standard, rather than being couched in traditional burden-of-proof terms. Id. at
1247. See also Proposals for a Model Rule on the Admissibility of Scientific Evidence, 26
JURIMETRICS 236 (E. Berjuoy ed. 1986).
243. See cases cited in 3 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 230, 702[03], at 702-37 n.6.
244. See, e.g., C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 203 (3d ed. 1984); McCormick, Scientific Evi-
dence: Defining a New Approach to Admissibility, 67 IowA L. REV. 879 (1982); 3 J. WEIN-
STEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 230, at 702[03].
245. See, eg., McCormick, Scientific Evidence, supra note 244, at 885-86.
246. This determination is the basic test for relevant evidence. FED. R. EVID. 401; CAL.
EVID. CODE § 210 (West 1966). See supra note 15.
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expert's testimony will assist the trier of fact.247 Specific factors guide
this determination.248 The probative value is then weighed against the
probative dangers, such as the potential to confuse or mislead the jury.24 9
The Kelly-Frye standard itself-general acceptance within the relevant
scientific community-is considered as one factor in the "helpfulness"
analysis.250 Those advocating this analysis have identified other factors
that could be considered in determining the admissibility of the evidence.
Two such proposals are discussed below. The description of the propos-
als is followed by two examples of cases which applied a traditional
analysis.
Weinstein and Berger have proposed that the following factors be
considered in determining whether expert testimony based on novel sci-
entific evidence will assist the trier of fact:
(1) The technique's general acceptance in the field;
(2) The expert's qualifications and stature;
(3) The use which has been made of the technique;
(4) The potential rate of error;
(5) The existence of specialized literature;
(6) The novelty of the invention; and
(7) The extent to which the technique relies on the subjective
interpretation of the expert.251
These factors play a role in balancing the probative value and prejudicial
dangers of the evidence. This balancing function is also an integral part
of the standard of "assisting the trier of fact ' 252 which is embodied in the
specific rule governing the proper subject areas of expert testimony. 25 3 A
247. This determination is the standard for admissibility of any expert testimony. See FED.
R. EVID. 702; CAL. EVID. CODE § 801 (West 1966).
248. These factors are not codified, but have been proposed to serve a screening function
similar to the Kelly-Frye test.
249. This is the balancing under the generalized rule regarding probative value and proba-
tive dangers. See FED. R. EvID. 403; CAL. EVID. CODE § 352. Section 352 of the California
Evidence Code provides:
The court in its discretion may exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue consump-
tion of time or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the
issues, or of misleading the jury.
250. See infra notes 251 and 259 and accompanying text for a listing of these factors.
251. 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 230, 702[03], at 702-41 to 42; see also
State v. Brown, 297 Or. 404, 687 P.2d 751 (1984).
252. Weinstein and Berger state that "the relevance and prejudice analyses implicated in
[FRE] 702's helpfulness standard must be utilized." 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra
note 230, 702[03], at 702-41. In particular, the authors refer to "the degree to which the
jurors might be over-impressed by the aura of reliability surrounding the evidence." Id.
702[03], at 702-42.
253. See, eg., FED. R. EVID. 702.
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more general evidence rule also allows the court to exclude any evidence
that is substantially more prejudicial than probative.254 Weinstein and
.Berger view this balancing approach as giving the court more flexibility
than the rigid Kelly-Frye test.255 They also consider this approach more
in keeping with the Federal Rules of Evidence.2 56 The rules reflect a
general policy that favors admissibility of evidence. Moreover, in their
view, the rules, which do not refer to any Kelly-Frye standard, were in-
tended to abandon the Kelly-Frye restriction.257
Justice Mark McCormick of the Iowa Supreme Court has also advo-
cated substituting a traditional analysis for Kelly-Frye.258 He has pro-
posed eleven factors for courts to consider under both the "helpfulness to
the trier of fact" standard for expert testimony and the general balancing
of probative value and prejudicial dangers:
(1) the potential error rate in using the technique;
(2) the existence and maintenance of standards governing its
use;
(3) presence of safeguards in the characteristics of the
technique;
(4) analogy to other scientific techniques whose results are
admissible;
(5) the extent to which the technique has been accepted by
scientists in the field involved;
254. Id. at 403. Weinstein and Berger also refer specifically to the probative dangers identi-
fied in Federal Rule of Evidence 403, such as "[c]onfusion of the jury, and the inordinate
consumption of trial time .... " 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 230, 1 702[03], at
702-43.
To the extent that Federal Rule of Evidence 702 (equivalent to California Evidence Code
section 801) embodies a balancing test of probative value and probative dangers, it overlaps
with the more generalized rule. See FED. R. EvID. 702, 403; CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 801, 352.
The analysis could differ, however, because the burden of establishing the prerequisites to ex-
pert testimony falls on the proponent of the evidence, IMWINKELRIED, EVIDENTIARY FoUN-
DATIONS 136-37 (1980), while under both Federal Rule of Evidence 403 and California
Evidence Code section 352 the burden of demonstrating prejudice which outweighs probative
value is placed on the opponent of the evidence. FED. R. EviD. 403; CAL. EVID. CODE § 352.
255. 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 230, 702[03], at 702-44.
256. See generally FED. R. EVID.
257. Id. at 702-36. Weinstein and Berger state that "Rule 702's failure to incorporate a
general scientific acceptance standard, and the Advisory Committee Note's failure to even
mention the Frye case, must be considered signficant. The silence of the rule and its drafters
may arguably be regarded as tantamount to an abandonment of the general acceptance stan-
dard." Id. Compare Giannelli, supra note 33, in which the author cites arguments that the
Federal Rules retained Frye, id. at 1228-29 (citing legislative history), as well as arguments
that the Federal Rules rejected Frye. Id. at 1230-31 (citing language of rules). The California
Evidence Code similarly does not codify a general scientific acceptance standard.
258. See McCormick, Scientific Evidence, supra note 244, at 905.
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(6) the nature and breadth of the inference adduced;
(7) the clarity and simplicity with which the technique can be
described and its results explained;
(8) the extent to which the basic data are verifiable by the
court and jury;
(9) the availability of other experts to test and evaluate the
technique;
(10) the probative significance of the evidence in the circum-
stances of the case; and
(11) the care with which the technique was employed in the
case.
2 59
Justice McCormick believes that a traditional analysis using these
factors will adequately meet the concerns that have prompted courts to
use the Kelly-Frye test: a uniformity in decisions; protecting the jury
from unreliable scientific evidence; and assuring a pool of experts exists
for the opponent.260 The traditional analysis, in his view, additionally
permits the use of factors that directly relate to the particular scientific
evidence and permits judges to evaluate the admissibility of the evidence
with legal concepts with which they have some familiarity.261
Extensive criticism of Kelly-Frye has initiated a trend away from the
restrictions of the Kelly-Frye test.262 Decisions from both the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit and from the courts of
Oregon provide good examples of courts substituting a traditional analy-
sis for the Kelly-Frye rule.
In United States v. Downing,2 63 the Third Circuit, in a case involving
expert eyewitness identification testimony, expressly rejected Kelly-
Frye264 and adopted a traditional analysis.26 The court outlined its anal-
ysis under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 which states the helpfulness
requirement of all expert testimony.266 Specifically, the court set forth a
three-part analysis pursuant to Rule 702 consisting of:
(1) the soundness and reliability of the process or technique
used in generating the evidence;
259. Id. at 911-12.
260. Id. at 909-11.
261. Id. at 916.
262. See cases cited in 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 230, 1 702[03]; Im-
winkelried, A New Era in the Evolution of Scientific Evidence-A Primer on Evaluating the
Weight of Scientific Evidence, 23 WM. & MARY L. REv. 261, 264-67 (1981).
263. 753 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1985).
264. Id. at 1232.
265. Id. at 1237.
266. Id. at 1237-42 (citing FED. R. EVID. 702); see also CAL. EvID. CODE § 801.
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(2) the possibility that admitting the evidence would over-
whelm, confuse, or mislead the jury; and
(3) the proffered connection between the scientific research or
test result to be presented, and particular disputed factual is-
sues in the case.2 67
In addition, the Downing court required that Federal Rule 403's balanc-
ing of probative value and prejudicial dangers also be conducted, even
though it overlapped with the analysis under Rule 702.268 The court rea-
soned that Rule 403 embodied additional concerns that could lead to
excluding evidence that might otherwise meet the Rule 702 test. For
example, the court noted that the availability of other evidence to estab-
lish the critical issue other than the proffered expert testimony might
convince a court to exclude the expert testimony.269 The court remanded
the case to the trial court to apply the analysis.2 7 ° On remand, the trial
court excluded the evidence. 1
In a polygraph case, State v. Brown, 2  the Oregon Supreme Court
also adopted a traditional analysis approach.273 The Brown court specifi-
cally adopted Weinstein and Berger's seven factors as part of the analysis
of the probative value of the testimony.2 74 The court was careful to state,
however, that other factors could be important and referred to Justice
McCormick's eleven factors. 75 The court proceeded to apply Weinstein
and Berger's seven factors to the polygraph evidence. 6 Although con-
cluding that the polygraph had probative value and would be helpful to
the trier of fact under the relevance and expert testimony rules,2 7 7 the
court ultimately rejected the admission of the polygraph evidence under
the general rule for balancing probative value and prejudicial dangers.2 78
In particular, the court was concerned that the jury would give undue
267. Downing, 753 F.2d at 1237.
268. Id. at 1242-43.
269. Id. at 1243.
270. Id. at 1244.
271. See 3 J. WEiNSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 230, 702[03], at 702-37 n.7.
272. State v. Brown, 297 Or. 404, 687 P.2d 751 (1984).
273. Id. at 408, 687 P.2d at 754.
274. Id. at 417, 687 P.2d at 759.
275. Id. at 417-18 n.5, 687 P.2d at 759-60 n.5.
276. Id. at 422-38, 687 P.2d at 762-72.
277. Id. at 438, 687 P.2d at 772.
278. Id. at 442, 687 P.2d at 775. The Brown court also found, as an alternative ground for
excluding the evidence, that the polygraph results were an impermissible comment on the
truthfulness of the witness. Id. at 442, 687 P.2d at 775. The court noted that the polygraph
examiner did not know the witness well enough to qualify giving his opinion on the truthful-
ness of the witness and that a statement of truthfulness on one occasion constituted an imper-
missible specific instance of truthfulness. Id. at 443, 687 P.2d at 775.
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weight to the results, that there were too few polygraph experts to pro-
vide an adequate pool of experts, and that trials would devolve into time-
consuming battles of experts.' 79
Using a traditional analysis, which specifically applies factors such
as Weinstein and Berger's, thus provides flexibility and guidance. Courts
can fashion the pertinent factors to the particular area of expertise. At
the same time, the specified factors provide a structure to guide the
courts' assessment of the evidence. Most importantly, the screening
function of the court is preserved. Moreover, the courts' role is not de-
pendent upon the applicability of the troublesome Kelly-Frye standard.
The final section proposes that California courts adopt a traditional anal-
ysis in child sexual abuse cases.
VI. A BETTER APPROACH TO ADMISSIBILITY OF EXPERT
TESTIMONY IN CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE CASES IN
CALIFORNIA
This section proposes that California courts adopt a modified tradi-
tional analysis approach to admission of expert testimony in child sexual
abuse cases. The first subsection discusses the need to abandon the Kelly-
Frye test. The impact of Proposition 8, the Truth-in-Evidence initiative,
is explored in the second subsection. The third subsection sets forth rea-
sons for adopting a traditional analysis. The final subsection applies the
proposed analysis to rape trauma syndrome, eyewitness identification tes-
timony, and finally, to child sexual abuse expert testimony.
A. Time to Abandon Kelly-Frye
The Kelly-Frye test should be abandoned in child sexual abuse cases.
As the cases from the courts of appeal demonstrate, it is an intellectual
nightmare to attempt to determine whether an expert's testimony is a
new scientific technique.2"' Moreover, the California Supreme Court has
eliminated the Kelly-Frye requirement in areas where evidence is unrelia-
ble by distinguishing between factual and opinion testimony281 and be-
tween personal opinion and scientific evidence.2" 2 The concurring judge
in People v. Bowker283 aptly described the state of the law:
Despite a plethora of case authority and textual materials on
the subject, Kelly-Frye remains an elusive and inconsistently
279. Id. at 439-42, 687 P.2d at 773-75.
280. See supra notes 53-71 and accompanying text.
281. See supra notes 72-83 and accompanying text.
282. See supra notes 64-70 and accompanying text.
283. 203 Cal. App. 3d 385, 249 Cal. Rptr. 886 (4th Dist. 1988).
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applied component in evidentiary law. It has variously been
defined as a test applicable to "scientific evidence" rather than
"expert medical opinion" [McDonald2 84], "new scientific pro-
cess operating on purely psychological evidence" [Shirley218 ],
expert medical opinion used to enhance the truth-finding pro-
cess rather than to rehabilitate a victim [Bledsoe 286], and any
new scientific methods of proof "to which fact finders would
tend to ascribe an inordinantly high degree of certainty" [Am-
ber B. 2 87 ]. It is amazing any trial court can determine what the
test is and on what evidentiary basis it rests, let alone apply it.
The results of applying Kelly-Frye are unpredictable because of confusing
and conflicting standards in its application. The concurring judge quoted
above in Bowker, for example, would have found Kelly-Frye inapplicable
to the generalized CSAAS testimony at issue because it was "expert med-
ical opinion" under People v. McDonald,2 88 while the majority, relying on
People v. Bledsoe, held it inadmissible under Kelly-Frye.289
B. The Impact of Proposition 8
Another issue is whether Proposition 8,290 the Truth-in-Evidence
284. 37 Cal. 3d 351, 690 P.2d 709, 208 Cal. Rptr. 236 (1984).
285. 31 Cal. 3d 18, 641 P.2d 775, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243 (1982).
286. 36 Cal. 3d 236, 681 P.2d 291, 203 Cal. Rptr. 450 (1984).
287. 191 Cal. App. 3d 682, 236 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1st Dist. 1987).
288. Bowker, 203 Cal. App. 3d at 399, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 895 (Benke, J., concurring) (citing
People v. McDonald, 37 Cal. 3d 351, 690 P.2d 709, 208 Cal. Rptr. 236 (1984)).
289. Id. at 396, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 892 (Benke, J., concurring) (citing People v. Bledsoe, 36
Cal. 3d 236, 681 P.2d 291, 203 Cal. Rptr. 450 (1987)).
290. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28. This subsection discusses the possible impact of Proposition
8, the Truth-in-Evidence provisions of the 1982 amendment to the California Constitution on
the continued viability of the Kelly-Frye standard. The impact is presently uncertain. At the
time this Article was going to press, the California Supreme Court decided the case People v.
Harris, 47 Cal. 3d 1047, 767 P.2d 619, 255 Cal. Rptr. 352 (1989). The court held, inter alia,
that Proposition 8 did not eliminate the Kelly-Frey test. Id at 1094, 767 P.2d at 649, 255 Cal.
Rptr. at 382. The polygraph evidence in question was found to be appropriately excluded
under that standard. Iad at 1094-95, 767 P.2d at 649-50, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 382-83. The court
based its conclusion on the theory that a scientific technique that is not generally accepted
within the relevant scientific community is unreliable and, therefore, irrelevant. Id See infra
notes 305-306 and accompanying text for a discussion of the merits of this rationale. Although
the impact of Proposition 8 will thus not contribute to the need for a new analytical approach
to expert testimony, the major arguments for abandoning Kelly-Frye and substituting a tradi-
tional analysis, as discussed in this Article, are unaffected. The confusion in the applicability
of Kelly-Frye and its inadequacy as an effective screening device for unreliable expert testimony
remain pressing issues, as exemplified by the child sexual abuse area. Thus, even though Prop-
osition 8 has not affected the status of the Kelly-Frye test, there is a need to adopt a more
workable, comprehensive approach to determine the admissibility of expert testimony on child
sexual abuse.
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provision of the California Constitution, has already eliminated the
Kelly-Frye test in criminal cases. Adopted in 1982, the initiative
provides:
Except as provided by statute hereafter enacted by a two-thirds
vote of the membership in each house of the Legislature, rele-
vant evidence shall not be excluded in any criminal proceeding,
including pretrial and post conviction motions and hearings, or
in any trial or hearing of a juvenile for a criminal offense,
whether heard in juvenile or adult court. Nothing in this sec-
tion shall affect any existing statutory rule of evidence relating
to privilege or hearsay, or Evidence Code, Sections 352, 782 or
1103. Nothing in this section shall affect any existing statutory
or constitutional right of the press.291
On its face, Proposition 8 would limit the exclusion of expert testi-
mony of any kind to an analysis of relevance under California Evidence
Code section 210292 and a balancing of probative value and prejudicial
dangers under section 352.293 The provision contains no exception for
expert testimony on any issue. Since Kelly-Frye imposes a standard of
admissibility higher than mere relevance on certain testimony, it conflicts
with the statute. Moreover, Proposition 8 arguably supersedes the "help-
fulness" requirement of section 801.294 The Assembly Committee on
Criminal Justice recognized the potential impact of Proposition 8. In its
analysis of the initiative, the Committee noted that polygraph and
voiceprint evidence, both of which were held inadmissible by courts in-
voking Kelly-Frye, were "likely to be made admissible .... 295 The At-
torney General's Guide to Proposition 8296 similarly acknowledges that
any exclusion of expert testimony, previously barred by section 801,
would have to be based on section 352 concerns.297 The Guide states
that "'[e]xpert' testimony on a subject of common experience would be
relevant, but excludable under Evidence Code section 352 on the ground
that its admission would necessitate undue consumption of time.)
298
291. Id.
292. CAL. EvID. CODE § 210 (West 1966); see supra note 26 for text of rule.
293. Id. § 352. See supra note 249 for text of rule.
294. The "helpfulness" requirement is phrased as whether the subject matter "is sufficiently
beyond common experience that the opinion of an expert would assist the trier of fact" in
California. CAL. EVID. CODE § 801 (West 1966). See also CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE As-
SEMBLY COMMITEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, ANALYSIS OF PROPOsmoN 8: THE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE INrIATIvE (1982) [hereinafter ANALYSIS OF PROPOSITON 8].
295. ANALYSIS OF PROPOSITION 8, supra note 294, at 12.
296. ATORNEY GENERAL's GUIDE TO PROPOSrION 8 (1982).
297. Id. at 4-15.
298. Id.
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The Guide further takes the position that the Kelly-Frye concerns would
be subsumed under section 352.299 It anticipates, however, that the same
evidence excluded by Kelly-Frye would be excluded through section
3 5 2 .3
0 0
The California legislature was apparently concerned about the likely
impact of Proposition 8 on the Kelly-Frye test as well. In 1983, it passed
Evidence Code section 351.1301 which provides for the exclusion of poly-
graph evidence in criminal cases unless stipulated to by all parties.3 "2
This provision is necessary to ensure the exclusion of polygraphs if Kelly-
Frye is eliminated by Proposition 8. The legislature was not willing to
take a chance on the interpretation of Proposition 8.
Is it possible that Kelly-Frye has survived as a judicially created test
even after Proposition 8? The California Supreme Court has yet to de-
cide the issue. Kelly-Frye cases decided by the court after Proposition 8
either involved pre-Proposition 8 proceedings or a Proposition 8 issue
was not raised by the parties.30 3 The lower courts, coping with expert
testimony in child sexual abuse cases, have continued to decide whether
Kelly-Frye applies without considering whether Proposition 8 has af-
fected the viability of the test.
3°4
If the Kelly-Frye test has survived Proposition 8, it must come under
the rubric of relevancy or balancing of probative value and prejudicial
dangers. Thus, one argument in favor of the continued existence of the
299. Id. at 4-46 to 4-47.
300. Id.
301. CAL. EvID. CODE § 351.1 (West Supp. 1988).
302. Id.
303. Thus, in neither People v. Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d 236, 681 P.2d 291, 203 Cal. Rptr. 450
(1984), nor People v. McDonald, 37 Cal. 3d 351, 690 P.2d 709, 208 Cal. Rptr. 236 (1984), did
the court address the effect of Proposition 8 on the applicability of the Kelly-Frye test. See also
People v. Poggi, 45 Cal. 3d 306, 323-24, 753 P.2d 1082, 1092-93, 246 Cal. Rptr. 886, 897
(1988) (no error to admit expert testimony on serological tests on Kelly-Frye basis where de-
fendant failed to object on that ground at trial and record was insufficient for court to deter-
mine what tests were conducted); People v. Guerra, 37 Cal. 3d 385, 411-13, 690 P.2d 635, 652-
53, 208 Cal. Rptr. 162, 178-79 (1984) (hypnotically refreshed testimony, which court found
did not satisfy Kelly-Frye in People v. Shirley, still fails to have general acceptance).
The California Supreme Court will soon have a chance to decide the effect of Proposition
8 on the Kelly-Frye test. In People v. Cooper, Crim. No. 24552 (Cal. Sup. Ct. filed May 5,
1987), the state suggested that Proposition 8 eliminates the Kelly-Frye test and argued strenu-
ously that it is time to turn to an alternative such as a relevancy analysis. See Respondent's
Brief at 299-317, People v. Cooper, Crim No. 24552. Arising in the context of a murder
prosecution, the Kelly-Frye issue involves the typing of blood stains through electrophoresis,
the same technique that was at issue in Brown. See also People v. Harris, Crim. No. 23805
(Cal. Sup. Ct. fied June 24, 1984) (defense argued polygraph admissible because no Kelly-Frye
obstacle).
304. See supra notes 53-97 and accompanying text.
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test would be that unreliable evidence is irrelevant under section 210.305
This argument is persuasive only if one assumes that a scientific tech-
nique that is not generally accepted is necessarily unreliable. However, a
newly discovered scientific technique, which has yet to achieve general
acceptance, may be reliable. Moreover, the standard under section 210 is
quite low threshold. 3 6 A scientific technique, such as a voiceprint analy-
sis, might have some tendency to establish the identity of the voice even
though the probative value of the analysis as conclusive is low due to
problems with its reliability. The other possibility is to implicitly incor-
porate the Kelly-Frye test into section 352.307 This is a more plausible
theory. Courts would find that unless the scientific technique is generally
accepted, prejudicial dangers do substantially outweigh probative value.
It would constitute an interpretation of section 352, but would not run
counter to Proposition 8. Incorporating Kelly-Frye into section 352,
however, does not solve the problems in applying the test to a new area.
C Rationale for Adopting a Traditional Analysis
Given that Proposition 8 may have superseded the Kelly-Frye test
and that the test is almost impossible to apply coherently, why not sim-
ply admit all relevant expert testimony? Is there any need for a height-
ened admissibility standard? Why not trust the trier of fact to give the
evidence the weight it deems appropriate? Scholars and practitioners
both value some form of screening by the judge before evidence reaches
the jury.30 8 A jury may accord too much weight to an expert's testimony
because of his or her impressive qualifications without evaluating its reli-
ability.30 9 This concern has left Kelly-Frye alive, despite its ineptness.
Justice will not be served if the judgment of the trier of fact is clouded by
expert credentials or a scientific "aura." Furthermore, if the scientific
evidence is novel, the opponent of the evidence will not be able to counter
it competently, leaving the trier uneducated and also creating an imbal-
305. See CAL. EvID. CODE § 210.
306. Id.
307. See id. § 352.
308. See, eg., the discussion in Symposium on Science and the Rules of Evidence, 99 F.R.D.
188, 230-33 (1983) [hereinafter Symposium], a conference sponsored by the American Bar
Association. See also supra note 242. Although it could be argued that Kelly-Frye should not
apply in civil cases, see, for example, discussion in Symposium, supra, at 275, the California
Courts of Appeal have not held that the nature of the case matters. See, e.g., Seering v. Cali-
fornia Dept. of Social Servs., 194 Cal. App. 3d 298, 239 Cal. Rptr. 422 (lst Dist. 1987) (day-
care license revocation proceeding); In re Amber B., 191 Cal. App. 3d 682, 236 Cal. Rptr. 623
(lst Dist. 1987) (dependency proceeding).
309. See Symposium, supra note 308, at 230-33; McCormick, Scientific Evidence, supra note
244, at 915.
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ance in the adversary system.31°
Although criticized as being too lenient in admitting scientific evi-
dence,311 a traditional evidence analysis containing specific guiding fac-
tors would serve as a better screening function than a pure Kelly-Frye
analysis, and cope with the potential effects of Proposition 8. It would
permit a level of judicial screening consistent with a recognition of the
greater use of expert testimony today.
The definitional problems in applying the Kelly-Frye test are less im-
portant in a traditional analysis because the standards that would be ap-
plied are whether the evidence assists the trier of fact and whether the
probative value outweighs the probative risks.31 '2 Thus, whether the evi-
dence is truly a "test" or "technique" is less of an issue because all expert
testimony must assist the trier of fact.313 Factors specifically relevant to
the area of expertise at issue could be developed. Different factors would
be applied, for instance, to psychological evidence than to a blood typing
technique. Moreover, because "general acceptance" in the "relevant sci-
entific community" is only one possible factor to consider, the defini-
tional quandaries over those terms under the Kelly-Frye standard are less
significant.
Furthermore, the balancing nature of a relevancy analysis permits
judicial screening of evidence in a context familiar to the courts.31 4
Courts routinely assess the probative value of evidence against its coun-
tervailing risks of prejudicing, confusing or misleading a jury.315 A tradi-
tional analysis permits a court to perform its usual role with respect to
scientific evidence as well.
The traditional analysis proposed by Judge Weinstein and Professor
Berger and Justice McCormick provides greater guidance to the court
than a generalized rule.316 By specifying factors to be considered, even
though no one factor is controlling, courts are forced to approach scien-
310. See, eg., McCormick, supra note 244, at 905.
311. See Symposium, supra note 308, at 230-33; McCormick, Scientific Evidence, supra note
244, at 905.
312. See supra notes 251-54 and accompanying text.
313. CAL. EVID. CODE § 801(a).
314. Professor Giannelli expressed the concern that the use of a substantive scientific stan-
dard places judges in an unfamiliar role. See Giannelli, supra note 33, at 1247.
315. Professor McCord's factors, necessity, reliability, understandability and importance,
discussed supra at note 242, are implicitly assessed in the relevancy analysis. The probative
value of the evidence depends upon the need for it and its inherent characteristics, such as
reliability. The probative risks include the likelihood of jurors' failing to understand or confus-
ing the issues.
316. Thus, in contrast to Professor McCord's more generalized factors, see supra note 242,
relevancy analysis provides for greater guidance to the courts.
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tific evidence in a systematic fashion. The factors remain flexible, how-
ever, allowing for the need to assess different types of expertise in
appropriate ways.
Traditional analysis provides for an effective screening of scientific
evidence in part because the burden of proof remains on the proponent as
it does under a Kelly-Frye analysis. 317 The proponent of the evidence
must demonstrate that the evidence will assist the trier of fact. The more
generalized probative-value-versus-probative dangers rule shifts to the
opponent of the evidence the burden of showing the probative value of
the evidence is outweighed by its risks. 318 A traditional analysis thus
provides for control over the admissibility of scientific evidence in part
through the allocation of the burden of proof. Proposition 8 may well
dictate that only a form of traditional analysis is appropriate for assessing
the admissibility of scientific evidence. If Proposition 8, in this context,
preserves only the basic relevancy and probative-value-probative-danger
rules, the courts may be forced to abandon Kelly-Frye. It would be ap-
propriate, however, for the courts to adopt specific factors to guide the
decisions made under those rules. Factors, such as those proposed by
Weinstein and Berger, would be helpful in assessing the probative dan-
gers of scientific evidence without creating a rule, such as Kelly-Frye, that
violates the Evidence Code.319
The one questionable aspect of a traditional analysis under Proposi-
tion 8 would be allocating the burden of proof. If Proposition 8 has elim-
inated section 801, which codifies that allocation,320 there may be no
basis on which to justify placing the burden of proof on the proponent.
Section 352, the provision on probative value-probative dangers balanc-
ing, imposes the burden on the opponent of the evidence.32
There are two arguments to retain the burden of proof on the propo-
nent of scientific evidence despite of the implied repeal of section 801.
The first is to view the probative value analysis as a function of relevancy.
It is the proponent of the evidence who must establish that it has a "ten-
317. People v. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d 24, 30-31, 549 P.2d 1240, 1244, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144, 148
(1976).
318. The evidence is to be excluded pursuant to section 352 only if it is demonstrated that
the "probative value is substantially outweighed" by probative dangers. CAL. EVID. CODE
§ 352 (West 1966). The assumption, therefore, is that the evidence is admissible unless shown
otherwise.
319. If the court declines to set specific factors to be considered pursuant to Evidence Code
section 352, Professor McCord's four factors would neatly fit within a probative-value and
probative-dangers analysis and provide more guidance than section 352's language on its face.
See supra note 242.
320. CAL. EVID. CODE § 801 (West 1966).
321. See supra note 319.
1148 [Vol. 22:1103
June 1989] TESTIMONY IN CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE CASES
dency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of conse-
quence to the determination of the action." '322 The problem with this
approach is that, when assessed against the factors suggested in the rele-
vancy analysis, the evidence may meet the low section 210 standard even
if its probative value is minimal. Relevant evidence may not assist the
trier of fact because of various factors, but this determination does not
deprive the evidence of its relevance.
The other argument is to interpret section 352 in this context to
mean that the probative value of expert testimony is substantially out-
weighed by probative dangers absent a demonstration that the testimony
meets section 801's requirements and the factors proposed in the tradi-
tional analysis approaches. This appears to be what the Attorney Gen-
eral anticipated would occur as a practical matter. His Guide states that
"[w]e may expect.., that the desire for uniformity emphasized in Kelly
... will lead the trial courts to the same conclusions reached by appellate
courts in [the decisions using the Kelly-Frye test].
323
The burden of proof issue, although problematic, is thus not insur-
mountable. However, the most important aspect of a traditional analy-
sis, balancing, is easily implemented. A balancing process is already a
common element in California in determining the admissibility of psy-
chological evidence.324 Even in cases that do not employ a Kelly-Frye
analysis, courts have balanced the probative value and prejudicial dan-
gers of the evidence. 325 The following three cases illustrate how the Cali-
fornia courts have applied a balancing test.
In People v. Murtishaw,326 the California Supreme Court found error
in the admission of expert testimony that a defendant in a capital case
would be likely to be dangerous in the future.327 The testimony was in-
troduced by the prosecution on the issue of aggravation in the penalty
322. CAL. EVID. CODE § 210. Because evidence must be relevant to be admissible under
section 350, the assumption is that the evidence is not admissible until the proponent demon-
strates that the evidence meets the requirements of section 210. See id. § 210 (West 1966).
323. ATroRNEY GENERAL'S GUIDE TO PROPOsrriON 8, supra note 296, at 4-47.
324. See, e.g., People v. Murtishaw, 29 Cal. 3d 733, 631 P.2d 446, 175 Cal. Rptr. 738
(1981), cerr. denied, 455 U.S. 922 (1982); People v. Roscoe, 168 Cal. App. 3d 1093, 215 Cal.
Rptr. 45 (5th Dist. 1985); People v. Phillips, 122 Cal. App. 3d 69, 175 Cal. Rptr. 703 (1st Dist.
1981).
325. See, e.g., People v. Murtishaw, 29 Cal. 3d 733, 631 P.2d 446, 175 Cal. Rptr. 738
(1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 922 (1982); People v. Roscoe, 168 Cal. App. 3d 1093, 215 Cal.
Rptr. 45 (5th Dist. 1985); People v. Phillips, 122 Cal. App. 3d 69, 175 Cal. Rptr. 703 (1st Dist.
1981).
326. 29 Cal. 3d 733, 631 P.2d 446, 175 Cal. Rptr. 738 (1981).
327. Id. at 767, 631 P.2d at 466, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 758.
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phase of the case.32 In deciding whether to impose the death penalty,
the jury was asked to determine if aggravating circumstances outweighed
mitigating circumstances. 329 The court noted that predicting future dan-
gerousness was unreliable.330  Studies indicated that false predictions
were common. 33 1 The court found it unnecessary to determine if the
Kelly-Frye test would apply to this testimony because the court had al-
ready taken judicial notice that such a prediction was unreliable.332 The
state argued that any problems in prediction should go to the weight of
the evidence, not its admissibility.333 The court acknowledged that the
likelihood that the defendant would be violent in the future might be
relevant to aggravation, but found that the probative value of the predic-
tive testimony was quite low because of its unreliability.334 As a conse-
quence of its low probative value, the court found that the prejudicial
impact "far outweighed" the probative value of the evidence. 335
In People v. Phillips, 336 a case decided the same month as Mur-
tishaw, the court of appeal also referred to section 352's provisions for
balancing probative value and prejudicial dangers. In Phillips, the court
indicated it might have excluded the expert's testimony regarding Mun-
chausen's syndrome by proxy.337 The court noted that "the probative
value of [the expert's] testimony was somewhat speculative, and that it
posed some risk of both confusion and prejudice .... ,,338 However, the
court found no abuse of discretion by the trial court in admitting the
testimony under section 352.
In People v. Roscoe,34 ° another court of appeal used section 352 as
an independent basis on which to exclude expert testimony on the spe-
cific child in a sexual abuse case.341 The court noted that the probative
value of the evidence would have been adequately presented by genera-
328. Id. at 773, 631 P.2d at 466, 470, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 758, 762.
329. Id. at 773, 631 P.2d at 469-70, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 762; see also CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 190.3 (West 1988).
330. Murtishaw, 29 Cal. 3d at 767, 631 P.2d at 466, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 758.
331. Id. at 768, 631 P.2d at 466, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 758.
332. Id. at 769 n.32, 631 P.2d at 467 n.32, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 759 n.32.
333. Id. at 770-71, 631 P.2d at 468, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 760.
334. Id. at 773, 631 P.2d at 470, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 762.
335. Id.
336. 122 Cal. App. 3d 86, 175 Cal. Rptr. 703 (1st Dist. 1981).
337. Phillips, 122 Cal. App. 3d at 87, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 714; see supra text accompanying
notes 78-83.
338. Phillips, 122 Cal. App. 3d at 87, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 714.
339. Id.
340. 168 Cal. App. 3d 1093, 215 Cal. Rptr. 45 (5th Dist. 1985).
341. Id. at 1100, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 50.
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lized testimony.342 The specific references to the victim in the case cre-
ated too great a prejudicial impact.343
A balancing process is thus an integral part of admitting scientific
evidence even with the existence of a Kelly-Frye test. A change from the
Kelly-Frye test to a traditional analysis, where the burden of persuasion is
on the proponent, would not trigger major changes in the admissibility of
expert testimony. As demonstrated in the final section, a traditional
analysis would continue to exclude evidence which was excluded under
the Kelly-Frye test, but would be based directly on all of the important
reasons to admit or exclude the testimony. As a result, courts would
have meaningful criteria to apply to a new area such as child sexual
abuse.
D. Application of a Traditional Analysis
The following two subparts compare a Kelly-Frye analysis with a
relevancy analysis in the areas of rape trauma syndrome, eyewitness
identification and child sexual abuse.
1. Rape trauma syndrome and eyewitness identification under a
traditional analysis
Using a traditional approach to expert testimony, a proponent of
rape trauma syndrome evidence would still face the problem of drawing
a conclusion of rape which is unsupported by scientific evidence. As in
People v. Bledsoe,3" which applied the Kelly-Frye test,345 an analysis us-
ing either Weinstein and Berger's346 or McCormick's347 factors should
result in exclusion of the expert testimony. The question under the
Kelly-Frye test was phrased as whether there was general acceptance in
the relevant scientific community. Under the Weinstein-Berger and Mc-
Cormick analyses, general acceptance is only one factor.348 Thus, apply-
ing Weinstein and Berger's list of factors 349 to Bledsoe as an example of
342. Id.
343. Id.
344. 36 Cal. 3d 236, 681 P.2d 291, 203 Cal. Rptr. 450 (1984).
345. Id. at 248-51, 681 P.2d at 297-98, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 456.
346. 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 230, % 702[03], at 702-41 to 42; see supra
note 251 and accompanying text.
347. McCormick, Scientific Evidence, supra note 244, at 905; see supra note 259 and accom-
panying text.
348. 3 J. WEINS'rEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 230, 702[03], at 702-41 to 42; McCor-
mick, Scientific Evidence, supra note 244, at 905; see supra notes 251 and 259 and accompany-
ing text.
349. 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 230, % 702[03], at 702-41 to 42; see supra
note 251 and accompanying text. Reference is made to the Weinstein and Berger factors be-
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the traditional analysis, one would find:
(1) The technique's general acceptance in the field for determining
whether a victim was raped would be very low;
35 °
(2) The expert's qualifications and stature would vary, although in
Bledsoe the expert was only a rape counselor and not a psychologist or
psychiatrist;
351
(3) The use made of the technique was to diagnose and treat pa-
tients for stress, not to determine the accuracy of the rape;
352
(4) The potential rate of error in using the syndrome to determine
who had in fact been raped would be indeterminable unless there were
studies using some kind of standard for assessing who had been raped.
Because the purpose of the counseling is to treat stress, the counselors
assume the truth of the victim's statement.3 53 Verifying the truth of the
rape would be difficult unless a researcher established either investigative
standards conducted in essence as a police investigation or, even less reli-
ably, assumed a guilty verdict indicated the truth of the rape;354
(5) Specialized literature on the syndrome existed that the oppo-
nent could rely on to impeach the expert, although none existed specifi-
cally addressing studies attempting to verify the accuracy of determining
who had been raped;
3 55
(6) The syndrome had been "invented" ten years before Bledsoe,
so it was not entirely "novel. ' 35 6 On the other hand, using the syndrome
to permit the conclusion that the victim had been raped would have been
novel;
(7) The "technique" clearly relied on the subjective interpretation
of the counselor or other expert.357 This means that it is harder for a
jury to assess its reliability.
cause courts tend to rely on their treatise. Justice McCormick's factors are an excellent source
of criteria for relevancy analysis as well.
350. Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d at 248, 681 P.2d at 299, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 458.
351. Id. at 240, 681 P.2d at 293-94, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 452.
352. Id. at 250, 681 P.2d at 300, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 459.
353. Id.
354. The Bledsoe court noted that "as far as we are aware, none of the studies has at-
tempted independently to verify the 'truth' of the clients' recollections or to determine the legal
implication of the clients' factual accounts." Id., 681 P.2d at 300, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 459.
355. See, e.g., the professional literature referred to in Bledsoe. Id. at 241 n.4, 243 n.5, 250,
251 n.13, 681 P.2d at 294 n.4, 295 n.5, 300, 301 n.13, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 453 n.4, 454 n.5, 459,
460 n.13.
356. Rape trauma syndrome was first named in 1974. See id. at 241 n.4, 681 P.2d at 294
n.4, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 453 n.4.
357. The rape counselor in Bledsoe, for example, made the judgment that the victim was in
the "reorganization phase" of the syndrome. Id. at 242, 681 P.2d at 295, 203 Cal. Rptr. at
454.
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Thus, rape trauma syndrome, as used in Bledsoe, would not fare
well under a traditional analysis. The consequence, exclusion of the testi-
mony, would therefore be the same under either a Kelly-Frye or a tradi-
tional analysis.
Perhaps a more difficult case would be the eyewitness identification
testimony in People v. McDonald. In that case, the California Supreme
Court did not subject the testimony to a Kelly-Frye analysis. 359 How-
ever, under a traditional approach, all expert testimony would be sub-
jected to a balancing test. Using the same Weinstein-Berger factors, the
testimony in McDonald would be treated as follows:
(1) The court cited numerous studies that recognized the impact of
the factors the expert intended to discuss on eyewitness identification.3 °
This appears to have indicated to the court that there is some degree of
acceptance of the technique, as the court merely footnotes the "minor-
ity" view that eyewitness identification testimony should not be relied
upon.361 The court further stated that "appellate judges do not have the
luxury of waiting until their colleagues in the sciences unanimously agree
that on a particular issue no more research is necessary. ' 362 On the
other hand, the court indicated that appellate courts rarely reversed the
exclusion of the evidence.363
(2) The expert was a psychologist with 20 years of experience in
both academia and the practice of psychology. He apparently had im-
pressive credentials, including research and authoring articles on the sub-
ject. The state did not challenge his credentials. 3"
(3) The use made of the "technique" was apparently to identify
those factors that affected eyewitness identification,365 which was the
same reason the testimony was sought to be introduced in court.
366
358. 37 Cal. 3d 351, 690 P.2d 709, 208 Cal. Rptr. 236 (1984).
359. Id. at 372-73, 690 P.2d at 724, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 250-51; see supra notes 64-69 and
accompanying text.
360. McDonald, 37 Cal. 3d at 365, 690 P.2d at 718, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 245.
361. Id. at 369 n.15, 690 P.2d at 721 n.15, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 248 n.15.
362. Id.
363. Id. at 365, 690 P.2d at 718, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 245. The McDonald court noted, how-
ever, that
the virtual unanimity of appellate decisions [which find no error in excluding the
testimony] may well be misleading.... [A]ppellate courts ordinarily confront the
issue only when the testimony has been excluded; and in all such cases appellate
courts tend to affirm, because of the deference traditionally accorded to discretionary
rulings of trial courts.
Id. at 365 n.10, 690 P.2d at 718 n.10, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 245 n.10.
364. Id. at 361, 690 P.2d at 715, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 242.
365. See, e.g., id. (reference to studies regarding eyewitness identification).
366. Id. The expert's testimony was intended "to inform the jury of various psychological
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(4) The potential rate of error was not too significant because there
was no conclusion that the witnesses in the specific case were impaired in
their identification. The testimony was general only, describing the types
of factors that could affect identification. 367 The possibility that these
factors could affect identification had been verified in the studies the
court referred to in (1).
(5) Specialized literature did exist, both pro and con.368 Thus, the
opponent would have had this as a resource for impeachment of the
expert.
(6) Most of the literature had apparently been published since
1978.369 The case reached the California Supreme Court in 1984. The
identification of the factors influencing eyewitnesses thus was relatively
"novel," although established enough to have a body of literature.
(7) The "technique" of merely identifying factors that influence
eyewitness identifications is not particularly a subjective judgment by the
expert, unlike the situation where the expert might state that a particular
witness was in fact mistaken because of certain factors.
The testimony in McDonald would thus fare much better under a
traditional analysis than the testimony in Bledsoe. On balance, because
no one factor is considered controlling, the testimony should probably be
deemed to assist the trier of fact. However, a traditional analysis also
requires a balancing under Rule 352. How important is the evidence to
the proponent? Is there any other evidence that could satisfy the purpose
of presenting the expert testimony? In McDonald, the court noted that
the main issue in the case was the identity of the murderer. 370 The prose-
cution's case consisted of seven eyewitnesses, six of whom identified the
defendant.371 They did not have any other evidence that tied the defend-
ant to the murder.372 The defendant called six alibi witnesses. 3  The
court viewed the issue of the accuracy of the eyewitnesses' identification
of the defendant as "both critical and closely balanced. ' 374 Although the
court stated that such expert testimony would not always be neces-
factors that may affect the reliability of eyewitness identification, and to 'help to counter some
common misconceptions' about the process." Id.
367. Id. at 361-62, 690 P.2d at 715-16, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 242-43.
368. Id. at 365, 369 n.15, 690 P.2d at 718, 721 n.15, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 245, 248 n.15.
369. Id. at 365, 690 P.2d at 718, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 245 C" 'over 85% of the entire published
literature has surfaced since 1978,"' (quoting Wells & Loftus, Eyewitness Research: Then and
Now, in EYEwrTNFsSS TESTIMONY: PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 3 (1985))).
370. Id. at 355, 690 P.2d at 711, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 238.
371. Id.
372. Id. at 360, 690 P.2d at 714, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 241.
373. Id. at 355, 360, 690 P.2d at 711, 714, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 238, 241.
374. Id. at 376, 690 P.2d at 726, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 253.
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sary,37 5 it found that it was prejudicial error to exclude it in McDonald
because of the importance of the issue.3"' Thus, the expert testimony in
McDonald would also have survived a section 352 analysis.
2. Child sexual abuse expert testimony under Kelly-Frye and
traditional analysis
Unlike rape trauma syndrome and eyewitness identification expert
testimony, the California Supreme Court has yet to provide any guidance
on the applicability of the Kelly-Frye test to child sexual abuse expert
testimony. The issue is not readily resolved. 377 However, in this section,
the probable outcome under Kelly-Frye is analyzed as well as the prob-
able outcome under a traditional analysis.
The critical issue for the courts of appeal has been whether the
Kelly-Frye test applies. If the test applies, the routine outcome is that the
expert testimony on child sexual abuse either did not meet the general
acceptance standard378 and/or the case was remanded for failure to re-
quire a Kelly-Frye foundation.379 The usual outcome if the test does not
apply is to admit the testimony. Thus, in In re Cheryl H.,38° where the
court never directly discussed the applicability of Kelly-Frye, the court
concluded that an expert's opinion that the child had been abused was
admissible. 81 Similarly, in Seering v. California Department of Social
Services,32 the court found that the same form of testimony did not trig-
ger Kelly-Frye and therefore would be admissible.3 3 The same result
was reached in People v. Gray,384 where the expert testified to general
characteristics. 5
On the other hand, applying Kelly-Frye will generally lead to the
375. Id. at 377, 690 P.2d at 727, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 254.
376. Id. at 376, 690 P.2d at 726, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 253.
377. See supra notes 93-97 and accompanying text.
378. See, eg., Seering v. California Dept. of Social Servs., 194 Cal. App. 3d 298, 313, 239
Cal. Rptr. 422, 431 (1st Dist. 1987) ("We conclude on the basis of the record before us that the
Department has not met its burden of demonstrating general acceptance of CSAAS in accord-
ance with the Kelly-Frye standard of admissibility."); In re Sara M., 194 Cal. App. 3d 585, 593,
239 Cal. Rptr. 605, 610 (3d Dist. 1987) ("The evidence adduced at the jurisdictional hearing
fails to meet [the Kelly-Frye] standard.").
379. See, eg., In re Amber B., 191 Cal. App. 3d 682, 691, 236 Cal. Rptr. 623, 629 (1987)
("The trial court therefore erred when it failed to require a showing of general acceptance in
the relevant scientific community in accordance with Kelly-Frye").
380. 153 Cal. App. 3d 1098, 200 Cal. Rptr. 789 (2d Dist. 1984).
381. Id. at 1116, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 799.
382. 194 Cal. App. 3d 298, 239 Cal. Rptr. 422 (1st Dist. 1987).
383. Id. at 314, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 432.
384. 187 Cal. App. 3d 213, 231 Cal. Rptr. 658 (2d Dist. 1986).
385. Id. at 218-19, 231 Cal. Rptr. at 661.
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exclusion of child sexual abuse expert testimony. The courts have noted
that there are no studies in the field demonstrating a general acceptance
of the conclusion that a child has been sexually abused based on either
CSAAS 31s or on other methodologies such as doll play.38 7 Nor is the
syndrome recognized in DSM-III or by any psychological professional
association.38 8 One court noted that the characteristics were developed
on the basis of an "assumption the children studied were in fact mo-
lested. ' 3 9 This means there is no control group from which to distin-
guish the characteristics of those children who have been abused.390
Further, the syndrome or description by Dr. Summit was developed for
treatment purposes like the rape trauma syndrome and not for the pur-
pose of determining actual abuse. 391 Another typical criticism is that the
proponent of the testimony has only his or her one expert testify to the
validity of the technique.3 92 The courts are hesitant to find that Kelly-
Frye is met on the basis of the word of one expert who is not a disinter-
ested witness.393 Given the state of the research in the area of child sex-
ual abuse, it is unlikely that in the near future either the syndrome or the
opinion that a particular child was abused will satisfy a Kelly-Frye
analysis.
Would expert testimony on child sexual abuse satisfy a traditional
386. See Seering, 194 Cal. App. 3d at 313, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 431. But see Myers, supra note
121, at 106-09 (recent studies described which attempt to validate diagnosis of abuse).
387. In In re Amber B., 191 Cal. App. 3d at 691, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 629 (citing People v.
Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 53, 723 P.2d 1354, 1374-75, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243, 265 (1982)), involving a
methodology of observing the child in doll-play and analyzing the child's reports of the inci-
dents, the court concluded that Kelly-Frye applied where a new scientific methodology in-
volved only psychological evidence. However, the court did not reach the issue of whether
Kelly-Frye could be met. The court remanded the case because the trial court failed to require
a showing that this methodology was generally accepted by the scientific community. Id.
However, there are very few studies in this area. See, e.g., In re Sara M., 194 Cal. App. 3d at
593, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 610-11 (experts "knew of no studies comparing the reactions of children
known to be molested with those who claimed to be molested or with those who were not
molested"); Seering, 194 Cal. App. 3d at 313, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 431 (expert unable "to cite any
specific studies or published reports demonstrating general acceptance of CSAAS in the rele-
vant scientific community for the purpose of establishing the occurrence of sexual abuse").
Such studies are beginning to be conducted, however, and may eventually establish the reliabil-
ity of behavior with dolls as a predictor of child abuse. See Myers, supra note 121, at 106-09.
388. See In re Sara M., 194 Cal. App. 3d at 589, 593, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 608, 610. There is
now a DSM III-R, published in 1987, which also does not list CSAAS. AMERICAN PSYCHIAT-
Ric ASSOCIATION DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (3d ed.-
Revised 1987); see also Seering, 194 Cal. App. 3d at 313, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 431-32.
389. In re Sara M., 194 Cal. App. 3d at 593, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 611.
390. See id. at 589, 593, 593 n.7, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 608, 610-11, 611 n.7.
391. Id. at 593, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 611.
392. See, eg., Seering, 194 Cal. App. 3d at 313, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 431-32.
393. Id.
[Vol. 22:1103
June 1989] TESTIMONY IN CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE CASES
analysis? Using Weinstein and Berger's seven factors,394 the following
analysis would take place:
(1) The technique would probably be found not to be generally
accepted in the field, at least for the purpose of determining whether a
child had been abused. 9 Like rape trauma syndrome, however, the de-
scription of the characteristics might well be generally accepted as typical
observed behavior of sexually abused children.396
(2) The experts in most of the cases are well-qualified and highly
regarded psychologists and psychiatrists who have worked extensively
with sexually abused children.397
(3) The use made of the "technique" is varied. It is used forensi-
cally to help police and prosecutors determine if a child has been
abused.398 There is also a therapeutic purpose in treating a child exper-
iencing stress that is not dependent on the truth of the child's
assertions.3 99
(4) The discovery of a potential rate of error is in its infancy. One
main criticism mentioned above is the absence of a control group of chil-
dren who have not been abused to determine the validity of ascribing
Summit's characteristics to abused children: °° There similarly is little, if
any, research verifying the accuracy of an opinion that a particular child
was abused that is based on interviews and/or doll play." 1
(5) The literature is not abundant at this time; 2 consequently, op-
posing counsel is at a disadvantage.
394. 3 J. WEiNSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 230, 702[03], at 702-41 to 42; see supra
note 251 and accompanying text.
395. See supra notes 385-93 and accompanying text.
396. See, eg., Gray, 187 Cal. App. 3d at 217, 231 Cal. Rptr. at 659 (defense expert "testified
that child abuse accommodation syndrome is not a generally accepted syndrome but acknowl-
edged that delayed reporting is not unusual in child molestation cases"). It makes sense that
the description would achieve general acceptance, unlike the conclusion that a particular child
had been abused, since the function in therapy would be to describe the child's symptoms in
order to determine the best treatment. It is thus more consistent with clinical practice than is
forensic diagnosis.
397. See, eg., Seering, 194 Cal. App. 3d at 311-13, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 430-31 (Dr. Corwin, a
psychiatrist, worked with Dr. Summit at UCLA and headed a "task force for interviewing
sexually abused children"); In re Sara M., 194 Cal. App. 3d at 588-89, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 607-08
(experts were both clinical psychologists). But see People v. Dunnahoo, 152 Cal. App. 3d 561,
577, 199 Cal. Rptr. 796, 804 (2d Dist. 1984) (police officers experienced in child molestation
cases allowed to testify as experts on behavior).
398. See supra testimony discussed in text accompanying note 125.
399. See In re Sara M., 194 Cal. App. 3d at 593, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 611.
400. See supra notes 385-86 and accompanying text.
401. See supra notes 385-86 and accompanying text.
402. See supra notes 385-86 and accompanying text. But see studies discussed in Myers,
supra note 121, at 106-09.
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(6) There is novelty in diagnosing that a child is sexually abused or
exhibits certain symptoms of child abuse.1 3 On the other hand, diagnos-
ing a stress reaction after a traumatic event is not unduly novel.' The
question is whether stress reaction analysis specifically applied to chil-
dren constitutes a more novel technique or approach.
(7) The determination that a particular child was abused depends
upon the subjective interpretation of the expert." 5 The simple descrip-
tion of characteristics or explanation of behaviors is not as subjective.
The outcome of the traditional analysis depends upon whether the
expert testifies generally about sexually abused children or a specific
child. Testimony about a specific child fares badly under all of Weinstein
and Berger's factors except for the stature-of-the-expert factor. 406 Gen-
eralized testimony, on the other hand, may survive analysis under several
factors: as a descriptive technique, it arguably has general acceptance-
it matches the use to which it is put in practice, it has little error poten-
tial, and it is less subjective than a diagnosis of a particular child's condi-
tion. This generalized testimony, analogous to the eyewitness
identification testimony of McDonald,' 7 would thus be more acceptable
at this stage of the traditional analysis than testimony about a specific
child.
The Weinstein and Berger factors pertain fo the probative value of
the evidence. It is still necessary to address the probative dangers of the
generalized testimony."4 8 How strong is the need for the evidence? Is
there other evidence that explains the child's reactions? Have any of the
child's behaviors been challenged? How confusing or misleading is the
testimony? Can the trier of fact be skeptical or will it be overwhelmed by
the testimony?
Individual cases will differ. The stage of the proceedings at which
403. The cases have primarily arisen in the 1980's. See, e.g., early California cases: In re
Cheryl H., 153 Cal. App. 3d 1098, 200 Cal. Rptr. 789 (2d Dist. 1984); People v. Dunnahoo,
152 Cal. App. 3d 561, 199 Cal. Rptr. 796 (2d Dist. 1984). Note, too, that Dr. Summit's article
identifying CSAAS was written in 1983. See Weisberg, The "Discovery" of SexualAbuse: Ex-
perts' Role in Legal Policy Formulation, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1, 45-55 (1984) for a discus-
sion of the legal approach to sexual abuse from an evolving emphasis on treatment (as opposed
to punishment) through the 1970's to a return to an emphasis on punishing offenders in the
1980's.
404. See discussion of post-traumatic stress disorder in DSM-III supra note 164, at 236-39.
405. The expert is relying upon his or her own judgment. There is no hard evidence, such
as a blood test, that would objectify the process.
406. See supra note 251 and accompanying text.
407. See McDonald, 37 Cal. 3d at 361-63, 367-69, 690 P.2d at 715-17, 720-21, 208 Cal.
Rptr. at 242-44, 247-48.
408. See supra text accompanying note 249.
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the evidence is offered as well as the development of the evidence in the
case impacts on its acceptability. The strongest need for the generalized
testimony would probably exist in a situation where the opponent has
challenged the child's behavior, such as proposing that, because the child
retracted her story at an earlier point, she is lying now about the abuse.
The expert's explanation of why sexually abused children will often re-
tract allegations of abuse would assist the trier's understanding of this
counterintuitive concept. This parallels the use of rape trauma syndrome
approved in Bledsoe" 9 and conforms with the use of eyewitness identifi-
cation testimony in McDonald.41 0 If such generalized testimony is of-
fered prior to such a challenge, there is considerably less need for the
expert testimony. Under those circumstances, the arguments that an ex-
pert's testimony may be less probative and may tend to awe the trier of
fact would be stronger. Despite the fact that the testimony is general in
form, the trier is still being asked to draw the inference from the expert's
testimony that the child was abused when the evidence is offered without
a rehabilitative purpose."1'
This result, admitting rehabilitative generalized testimony by an ex-
pert on child sexual abuse, is quite possibly the result the California
Supreme Court would reach under an analysis of the Kelly-Frye stan-
dard. The traditional approach, however, would require less tortured
logic. The courts would not have to make the distinction between a sci-
entific technique and personal opinion or between a factual description
and an opinion. The discrepancies that exist now among the courts of
appeal over the application of Kelly-Frye would be minimized.
VII. CONCLUSION
A traditional analysis would provide a uniform approach to the ad-
missibility of expert testimony. Courts would continue to reach different
conclusions about the admissibility of expert testimony on child sexual
abuse through balancing the probative value and probative dangers of the
evidence. Different results are to be expected because the need for the
409. See Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d at 247-48, 681 P.2d at 298-99, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 457-58 (rape
trauma syndrome admissible only "to rebut misconceptions about presumed behavior of rape
victims," not to prove that rape occurred).
410. See McDonald, 37 Cal. 3d at 361-63, 690 P.2d at 715-17, 720-21, 208.Cal. Rptr. at 242-
44, 247-48 (general testimony regarding effects of psychological factors on eyewitness testi-
mony admissible).
411. If expert testimony about a particular child surmounted the Weinstein and Berger
factors, a similar argument could be made that the probative value of testimony about a spe-
cific child is outweighed by the prejudicial impact. See People v. Roscoe, 168 Cal. App. 3d
1093, 1100, 215 Cal. Rptr. 45, 50 (5th Dist. 1985).
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testimony will vary in individual cases. The important conceptual
change is that the applicable analytical framework would be consistent in
all cases.
Under a Kelly-Frye analysis, the admissibility of expert testimony in
child sexual abuse cases is unpredictable. Moreover, the form of the ex-
pert's testimony is arbitrary and subject to manipulation. The form may
control its admissibility, rather than its substance and its context.4 2
Under a traditional approach, it would not matter whether the ex-
pert testified that the child suffered from CSAAS, was sexually abused
without ever mentioning CSAAS, or generally described characteristics
of abused children. Each form of testimony would be subjected to an
analysis of specific factors that reflect the probative value and probative
danger of that testimony. The variance in admissibility would be due to
the legitimate balancing of probative value and probative dangers in the
case before the court. The traditional approach, through expert and rele-
vancy rules, would bring coherency to what now is a chaotic state of law.
412. See, eg., Seering v. California Dept. of Social Servs., 194 Cal. App. 3d 298, 311, 239
Cal. Rptr. 422, 430 (1st Dist. 1987) (expert's "personal opinion" that child was abused not
subject to Kelly-Frye and therefore admissible, but same expert's opinion that victim's behavior
was consistent with CSAAS subject to Kelly-Frye and therefore inadmissible). See also supra
notes 163-66 and accompanying text.
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